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PREFACE
The project undertaken is essentially tracing the 
difficulties and frustrations of Hew Zealand, as she des­
perately endeavored to defend herself against the threat of 
an invasion by Japan* It is not intended to be an all- 
inclusive survey of New Zealand during the war years, but 
covers only diplomatic and governmental procedures concern­
ing defense* Within this framework of events is a descrip­
tion of a Dominion torn between intense loyalty to Great 
Britain and the need to sever many of these bonds in the 
Interest of self-preservation* It is a study of a country 
attempting to embark upon a course of national self-interest 
but finding that it cannot break a tradition cherished for 
over a century*
This thesis would never have been attempted, much 
less completed, without the guidance and encouragement of 
Dr* A* Stanley Trickett, Chairman of the Department of 
History at the University of Omaha* 1 would also like to 
thank the graduate faculty of the Department of History for 
allowing me to do my graduate work tinder their direction* 
Deepest gratitude to Miss Ella Jane Dougherty of the Omaha 
University Library, whose patience and skill in locating the
iii
ir
needed research material made this thesis passible* Finally* 
a special thanks to Harlan Nelson who typed this thesis 
under nest difficult circumstances*
Riverton* Wyoming 
December, lf€?
Allen Un|t
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CHAPTER I
PREPARATION FOR WAR
New Zealand, a eountry of* limited strategic Importance 
and geographically isolated from the rest of the world has 
maintained unusually strong ties with the mother country, 
Great Britain. This tenacious relationship, at a time when 
the other Commonwealth countries valued independent action, 
has led some historians to describe the attachment as a 
"mother complex.
Cultural and economic bonds with the mother country 
led New Zealand, prior to World War II, to be only passively 
interested in Asian affairs but vitally concerned with Europe 
and its troubles* The distance from Europe and limited 
knowledge of events in Asia gave New Zealand, before 1931 * 
a sense of security* She saw no need for home defense and, 
in fact, at every Imperial Conference from 1919-1933 had
been told that in the event of war, she should send food and
2men to Europe-— just as she had done in World War I. The
1
Louis Vasserman, "The United States and New Zealand; 
Political and Commercial Relations" (unpublished Ph.D. dis­
sertation, Dept, of History, University of California, 19^®)* 
p. 264. Hereafter cited as Wasserman, "The United States 
and New Zealand."
^Frederick Lloyd Whitfield Wood, The New Zealand 
People at War; Political and External Affairs (Wellington: 
War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 195®)* P» 
59. Hereafter cited as Wood, Political and External Affairs.
1
2sudden rise of Japanese power, however, caused the Dominion 
to question this policy.
At the Imperial Conference of 1933 much discussion, 
for the first time, centered around the new threat in Asia 
and the possibility of Japanese expansion into the Southern
Pacific. To protect her Empire, Britain decided that the
3
naval base at Singapore should be heavily fortified* In
case of an emergency the Royal Navy would move to Singapore
and use it as a base to protect the Commonwealth* Plans were
also Biade for an elite Commonwealth force composed of troops
from all the Dominions to be stationed in India during peace
4and moved to Singapore if war should come.
New Zealand delegates left the conference determined 
to press for expansion of defenses against possible Japanese 
aggression. Hard hit by the economic depression, agrarian 
New Zealand had cut its defense budget from £901,000 for the 
fiscal year 1930-31 to £685,000 for 1931-32. 5 The preoccupa- 
tion of the Imperial Conference with Japan in 19331 however, 
prompted a somewhat reluctant Parliament to increase the
In 1926 the New Zealand Parliament voted one million 
pounds to be used to help build Singapore. The last install* 
sent was paid in 1936. For more information see G. R.
Powles (ed.), Contemporary Hew Zealand (Wellington and others: 
Whitcombe and Tombs, Ltd., 1 9 3 8/, p . 249* S. D. Waters, The 
Royal New Zealand Navy (Wellingtons War History Branch, 
Department of Internal Affairs, 1956), p. 10. Hereafter 
cited as Waters, The Navy.
^Wood, Political and External Affairs, pp. 60~6l.
^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCXXXV1 (1936),
538.
3defense budget from approximately £7 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 3 2 -3 3 to
6£790,000 for 1933-34* Plans were made for a coastal defense 
system, constructed over a period of six years at a cost of
7
£1,000,000 and an Imperial Defense Committee was formed to
survey New Zealand resources and plan for any emergency that
might arise. 8
Hysteria over the Japanese did not exist for long*
It was easy to rationalize that densely-populated Japan with
pressing economic problems must inevitably expand into
9China* This, coupled with the fact that New Zealand, a land 
of few natural resources, had just concluded a trade agree­
ment with J a p a n , m a d e  New Zealanders feel that there was 
little reason to fear the "Land of the Rising Sun*" In fact, 
during 1933 the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff declared that war 
with Japan was possible, but suggested that such a war was
much more likely to result from economic causes than from
11direct aggression* The Chiefs added that relations with 
Japan were currently stable enough to allow for continuation 
of plans to send an expeditionary force to Europe even larger
6Ibid. 7Ibid., p. 555.
8 Ibid.. p. 5 5 9.
Wood, Political and External Affairs. p. 64.
10Bernard K. Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific 
Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I960), pp. 63-64*
11Wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 62; Gordon, 
New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, p7o7*
k1 othan that which was sent in World War X« Thus at the end
of* 1935, New Zealand * & military planners were thinking
chiefly of possible war in Europe and the Dominion's reaction
to the same as a loyal member of the Commonwealth*
Complete reversal of this policy occurred when, in the
last months of 1935, the labour Party gained control of the
government* The new Cabinet had neither experience nor had
they been briefed on foreign affairs* Gradually they became
aware of the actual threat of Japan and not only increased
defense expenditure but also started a program to enlarge
13military forces* Total expenditure for the Armed Forces
increased from slightly over £1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 3 5 -3 6 to
El,526,000 for 1936-37. 14 Efforts were made to enlarge all
branches, but particular emphasis was placed on the Air Force
15as the major defense against invasion*
The new Government, in matters of foreign policy, 
attempted to break a long tradition of allowing Britain to 
dictate the Dominion's position in world affairs* Interest 
in the League of Nations, which had been waning in the former 
administration, now became intrinsically involved in all 
policy considerations* The Labour Government believed that 
security in the Pacific as well as security of the entire
12  ^Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ja Pacific Power, p. 76•
*^Wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 6 3 *
1 4New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLX (1938), 384*
1 5Ibld., CCXXXVI (1936). 546.
516British Empire depended on the League* With this in mind
the Dominion became one of the strongest exponents for
17League action, and in the remaining years before the war, 
on several occasions, directly opposed Great Britain*® 
policies in relation to both European and Asiatic countries* 
This was indeed a departure from the docile New Zealand of 
previous years*
The independent attitude of the Labour Government, 
however, did not receive the united support of all people* 
Many New Zealanders thought it ridiculous for a small country 
with Inexperienced politicians to oppose the tried statesmen 
and diplomats of Great Britain* To these people an indepen­
dent policy seemed even more absurd when viewed in the light
of the Dominion*® total reliance on the mother country for 
iSdefense* Other people saw the Japanese threat as being of 
no great significance* In a speech before the House of 
Representatives on August 19, 1936, F* Jones, Minister of 
Defense, stated that the danger, in the opinion of experts, 
was "• * * a raid by a cruiser or an armed merchantman or the
16 Ian F* G. Milner, New Zealand* s Interests and Poli­
cies in the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Rela­
tions, 1937)* P * 83* Hereafter cited as Milner, Policies in 
the Far East *
17Gwendolen M. Carter, The British Commonwealth and 
International Security; The Role of the Dominions, 1919-1939 
(Toronto s The Ryerson P r e s s 1947*77 P* 259*
1 Q
Horace Belshaw (ed*), New Zealand (Berkeley, Califor­
nia; University of California Press, 1947)* pp« 306-30?•
6laying of mines near our coast,” He added that Mthe esti­
mate of the size of the Force that would be landed in New 
Zealand • • • /would b©7 two hundred* • • • The presence
of Singapore would stop any fleet from invading New Zealand
20because the cost would be greater than the gain*
The heated criticism of Labour defense policy cooled
when Japan launched her Invasion of China in 1937* Invasion
of Manchuria, in 1931* had been viewed somewhat passively*
but the current invasion now caused definite public reaction*
Newspapers generally concluded that this attack was indeed
21unwarranted aggression* Longshoremen and dock workers* in 
complete agreement with the newspapers* began an unofficial 
boycott of Japanese goods by refusing to handle any imports
or load any ship from the Asiatic country* Farmers generally
22opposed any official restrictions placed on Japan but this 
did not deter the Government from making the various proposed 
defense plans more concrete*
The Imperial Conference of 1937 was of tremendous 
help in guiding the defense planning of the Labour Government* 
New Zealand delegates * at the conference, displayed grave
19New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates. CCXXXVI (1936),
560.
20Wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 64*
2*Milner, Policies in the Far East * p« 107•
oo n
Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ja Pacific Power, pp* 89-
90; Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. o5*
7concern over the protection Britain could offer if the threat
became a real invasion* At the opening of the conference
Prime Minister Michael J • Savage stated:
I fully realise that the Dominion which I have the 
honour to represent is both small and distant, and 
that we can hop© to play only a modest part in the 
deliberations of the conference or indeed, the af­
fairs of the world* Nevertheless we hold definite 
views on many of the subjects that this conference 
has been called to consider • « • it will be my
function to express those views as cogently, indeed 
as forcibly, as 1 can*
New Zealand did play a major part when the conference began
discussing Commonwealth policy in the Pacific*
Prime Minister Savage frankly told the members of the
conference that his country had doubts about the protection
New Zealand would receive if Britain faced enemies in both
24Europe and Asia* He flatly stated that if Great Britain 
were pressed, she would give very little assistance to his 
country.25 He suggested a Commonwealth body be established 
to determine what forces were needed and where they would be
4.sent*
2^Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol« XII (Re­
ports, Vol. VIII) CMD 54I 2 , October, 1937* HImperial Confer­
ence 1937* Summary of Proceedings," 57*
24Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, pp• 77- 
7 8 . ------------------------------------
2^Wood, Political and External Affairs, p • 67*
Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ei Pacific Power, p* 7 8 *
8The British delegation denied that they would ever 
neglect the Pacific Commonwealth countries and reassured 
New Zealand that naval strength as of 1937 could handle any 
possible emergency* They added that Singapore was being 
fortified to warn the Japanese that Britain had not forgot­
ten her obligation in the Pacific.
Prime Minister Savage, in a speech made after he re­
turned from the conference, declared ” . * * if we defended
New Zealand alone we could not develop sufficient strength
28to pull a herring off a gridiron.” Despite the emphasis 
Savage placed on collective security, the conference con­
vinced New Zealanders that more reliance must be placed on 
their own defensive measures* Skeptical of British reassur­
ances, Parliament voted to expand the defense budget to 
£1,561,986 for the year 1937-38— an increase of £300,000 
over the previous year.2^
Although all three services enjoyed the defense budget 
Increase, most of the activity centered around the Air Force
2^Ibid*, pp* 78-79• The dedication of Singapore naval 
base was held February 14, 1938* The base had the largest 
dry dock in the world, the largest floating dock in the 
world, and enough fuel stored for six months normal fleet 
operation* The base was fortified with huge guns with an 
estimated range of forty miles and the islands around Singapore 
were also fortified* For more information see "Gibraltar of 
the Far East," Literary Digest, January 29* 193®» PP* 8-9*
pQ
"New Zealand," The Round Table, December, 1937* P •
202*
2^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLI (1938),
384*
9and Army. Construction of air bases was proceeding at a
rapid pace; torpedo bombers bad been purchased and plans were
30laid Cor long-range bombers manned by full-time men. The
Army, consisting of over 8*000 poorly-trained reservists,
planned to protect ports, repel enemy raiding parties and
31train new recruits. To stimulate enlistments, a three-
32month vocational and training program was inaugurated.^
Expansion for the Navy was in the form of two modern light
33cruisers on loan from Great Britain.
Labour officials had always assumed that in event of 
war the Navy and the Air Force would immediately come under 
British command. Contrary to the views of the former adminis­
tration, however, no plans were made for use of the Army in
34Europe, as had been done in World War I. In fact, on 
October 2@, 1937, the New Zealand Government made it clear
30Powles (ed.), Contemporary New Zealand, pp. 25^-255*
^Wood, political and External Affairs, p. 69* As of 
1938 the regular Army included 8 4 officers and 200 other 
ranks. The Territorials (National Guard) consisted of 8,290 
men. New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCXXXVX (1930)*
255*
32Powles (ed.), Contemporary New Zealand, p. 252. The 
draft had been discontinued in 1930*
33Waters, The Navy, p. 13. The two ships were of the 
seven thousand ton class. All the officers and half the men 
were from Britain, but New Zealand was responsible for all 
the financial aspects connected with the ships* Also see 
Powles (ed.), Contemporary New Zealand, p. 250.
34Powles (ed.). Contemporary New Zealand, pp. 262-263* 
J . V • T. Baker, The New Zealand People at War*Twe 11 ington:
War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1965),
P. 31.
io
to the British that they would not promise an expeditionary
3 e
force if a European war occurred.
Although Government officials generally agreed that 
expansion of the military forces was necessary, a sharp con** 
troversy arose over the ultimate size and goal of the defense 
forces. Defense Minister F. Jones* in a statement on May 17 * 
19381 argued that 9*000 men was an adequate army during this 
time of peace. He added that a total of 7 *^00 men were now 
serving* of which 41 per cent had been recently trained. The 
Defense Minister*s optimistic statement on military strength 
was completely discredited on the following day when four 
Army Colonels stated that defense preparations were completely 
inadequate•^
The opinion of the Colonels was supported by C. A*
Berendsen* permanent head of the Prime Minister's department,
37who Informed the newly*organized Council of Defense*" that if
war occurred* little assistance would come from Great Britain
38for months and probably even years. The Navy spokesman at
3  <5Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ja Pacific Power * p. 8 8 .
36Wood* Political and External Affairs, p. 70. The 
four Colonels were placed on the retirement list for breach 
of military ethics.
*^Baker* The New Zealand People at War, p. 31. This 
was a cabinet sub-committee, organized in 1937 to advise in 
defense preparations•
^^Wood* Political and External Affairs t p. 67*
IX
the Council M. • • agreed that the British fleet might not
come to Singapore for an indefinite p e r i o d * T h u s ,  by
the end of 19 3$, there seemed to be a split among both
civilian and military authorities over matters of defense*
Military planning, although proceeding at a rapid pace, lacked
direction and leadership*
New Zealand for several years had wanted a conference
with Great Britain and Australia dealing exclusively with
problems concerning the defense of the South Pacific* She
had always felt that there needed to be increased cooperation
with Australia and also a clarification of defense procedures
40between the two Pacific Dominions and the mother country*
Now, with dissension in New Zealand over long range defense 
planning, a conference seemed imperative* After a great deal 
of persuasion, Australia and Britain finally agreed to meet 
in Wellington, New Zealand*
The Pacific Defense Conference met from April 14-23,
4l1939* The topic of the conference centered around Pacific
relations and defense* More specifically, discussions were
held on enemy action in the Pacific before the British fleet
would arrive, how large enemy attacks would be, and the proba-
42ble amount of damage that would occur from these attacks*
39»id.
40Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power * pp• 96-
9 7 . ~
4lIbid., p. 9 6 . Ibid.. p. 9 8 .
12
A majority of the meetings, however, dealt with the naval
base at Singapore as the basic defense against Japanese
aggression* Great Britain reassured the other members that
If war broke out she would come to their aid regardless of
43the severity of the European crisis* New Zealand remained 
very skeptical of these reassurances, but there was little
that she could do to influence Great Britain’s defense
44policy*
Further discussions were held on the probability of 
defending the smaller islands in the Pacific. New Zealand 
delegates maintained that if the islands surrounding their 
country were to fall into the hands of the Japanese, New 
Zealand would be subject to air attacks* It was decided 
that, due to the impossibility of protecting all islands, 
only the most strategic in relation to Commonwealth defense
^Wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 76• Less 
than a month before the conference, the British Prime Minis­
ter sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of Australia stating 
that the sis&e of the fleet at Singapore would depend on when 
Japan entered the war and also on the losses sustained by 
Great Britain, as well as her opponents* J• R* M* Butler, 
Grand Strategy, Vol. II, September, 1939—-June, 1941, in His­
tory of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, 
edited by J. H* M* Butler (London: H. M. Stationary Office,
1957), p« 326* An Admiralty report at this same time also 
stated that it would be 180 days after the outbreak of war be­
fore any relief would arrive at Singapore* Wood, Political 
and External Affairs, p. 67*
44According to Gordon, British military leaders had 
dealt with New Zealand defense shortly before the conference* 
They stated that it would be in New Zealand's best interests 
to help reinforce Singapore. New Zealand Chiefs of Staff 
agreed but hesitated to send men out of the country when they 
believed every man was needed for defense at home* Gordon,
New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, p* 6?•
13
would be fortified* The other islands would have to rely
45on their own defenses until help arrived* ^
Xn relation to long-range planning, the problem of
deployment of supplies was discussed* Hew Zealand complained
that it was difficult to obtain materials since she was
totally reliant on Great Britain* Australia could not help
because she could barely meet her own defense requirements*
Suggestions were made to solve the problem but little else
46was accomplished*
Probably the most concrete proposal that came from
the conference was Britain* s insistence that Hew Zealand step
up her program of training men for home defenses* It was
strongly implied that those men could also serve in other
places if need be* Though this was a conference on Pacific
defense, the British hinted that an Expeditionary Force might
47still be sent to Europe* To help New Zealand, Major-General 
P* J* Mackesy, chief British military delegate at the confer­
ence, remained in the Dominion to report on the state of
48defense preparations*
In an interview held after the conference had ended, 
Prime Minister Savage reported that the dominant view at the 
end of the conference was the desire of the three nations to
^Ibid*, pp. 100-101? Wood, Political and External 
Affairs, p. 79.
^ W ood, Political and External Affairs, p. 7 8*
4 7Ibid. 4®Ibid., pp. 7 9-8 0 .
14
1&Q
cooperate in defense• He added: HWe know what the con*
ference asks us to do, and our Job is to push on with it to
50the utmost with the principals concerned."
Prompted by Britain's insistence that defense prepara*
tions be expanded, the Labour Government immediately issued
51a call for able men to volunteer for the Army* This first 
call seemed to pass unnoticed by the public, so, a month 
later Prime Minister Savage issued another appeal to all men 
between the ages of twenty and fifty-five. Savage informed 
the public that the Army needed 6,000 men and added that men 
ages twenty to thirty-two with no military experience should 
volunteer for the Territorials; men between the ages twenty
and fifty-five with some military experience should volunteer
52for the Reserves. Chief of General Staff, Major-General 
J. £• Duigan, in an interview, related that a force of 21,000
^The Evening Post (Wellington), April 2, 1939, p* 10* 
5°Ibid., April 2 6 , 1939, p. IO.
5 1Ibid., May 15, 1939, p. 15.
52Xbid.. May 23, 1939, p. 8, and May 24, 1939, p. IO.
The Reserves were divided into three classes of men. Class 
I consisted of men twenty to thirty-five years of age with 
two years military experience. They were to train thirty- 
six hours per year. Class II consisted of men thirty-five
to fifty-five years with some military experience. They
were to meet four times a year. The third class consisted of 
men of the same age only with no military experience. They 
were to work with engines and other special equipment. For 
more information, also see New Zealand, Pari lament ary Debates, 
CCLIV (1939), 8 3 2.
15
5 3men would be the goal of the expanded Army* Enlistment,
however, did not come as fast as officials expected* By
the end of July there were only 898 officers and 11,017 meii
54in the Territorials— New Zealand's first line of defense*
The lack of enthusiasm for volunteering led to another
political crisis over the means of raising an Army* Sir
James Parr, a former member of the Imperial Defense Council,
declared that New Zealand needed a force of 40,000 or 50,000
men to defend herself* He contemptuously proclaimed that
the Army was fortunate if they could field a force of 5*000
aea*^ Parr, along with many other people, advocated con-
56scription as the only effective means of raising an army*
Prime Minister Savage, although admittedly disappointed with
the lack of volunteers, announced that there was no need for
conscription* He declared that he did not want men to come
into the Army with the threat of war on their minds* He
then pronounced, ”1 am not asking them to go abroad* X want
57them for the defense of New Zealand in New Zealand*"
^^The Evening Post (Wellington), May 2 6 , 1939, P • IO*
5 Ibid.. July 20, 1938, p. 8 . On July 26, Defense 
Minister Jones announced the regular Army would be increased 
to 6 00 men with a comparable Increase in staff and artillery 
corps* Ibid*, July 2 6 , 1939* p* 12.
5?Ibld.. April 29, 1929. p. 25-
56 <% ^ Ibid*, June 8 , 1939* p* 9» The most outspoken con­
scription advocate was the Defense League* This organization 
began in 1 9 3 6, and counted many influential parliamentarians 
among its members*
57Ibid., p. Ik.
16
Despite the preoccupation over the adequacy of the 
Army, definite progress was made in other branches of de­
fense— especially the Air Force. Construction of new air 
bases continued at a rapid pace. Plans were made for an Air 
Force composed of four squadrons and 310 planes9 with a
standing reserve of 5 *0 0 0 men to be used in case of emergen-
58
cy. By the end of July, 1939* it was reported that the 
Air Force had increased fifteen*-fold in men and twenty-fold
59
in machines over the Force of 1935*
Beyond the expansion of ports and port facilities,
little was done in relation to the Navy. The Navy knew that
when war was declared, whether it be Bast or Nest, it would
immediately become part of the British Royal Navy.**0
Total engrossment over defense preparation was momen-
6ltarily interrupted by the Tokyo Agreement. The appeasement 
policy of Great Britain toward Japan was received with mixed 
feeling in New Zealand. The Reverend A. H. Nordmeyer, member 
of the House of Representatives, bitterly denounced it as an 
’•Eastern Munich.” He cried that the present British policy 
was M• * • calculated to disrupt the Empire and in the long
^^Milner, Policies in the Far East, p. 100.
^^The Evening Post (Wellington), July 28, 1939* P • 10.
**°Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 6 8 .
61 For more information on the Tokyo Agreement see E.
L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.), Documents on British For- 
e i m  Policy (3rd Series? Londons H. M. Stationary Office, 
1959-61). XX, 304-305.
17
62run to bring us into a disastrous war!" The concessions 
given to Japan did not concern New Zealand as much as the 
fact that she was not asked to participate in making the 
decision. The agreement was officially announced in New 
Zealand a day after it had been published in the Press* New
Zealanders remarked that "If there was a Commonwealth policy
6 3In the Pacific, New Zealand had no hand in shaping it."
Opposition to the Tokyo Agreement was not, however,
64unanimous* Acting Prime Minister Peter Fraser, stated
that his Party was in complete accord with British foreign
oolicv.^ The Evening Post (Wellington) added that Britain
could not handle Japan alone and since none of her allies were
interested in helping, the mother country had no choice but
66to appease Japan*
Throughout the end of July and into August, defense 
build-up proceeded at a frensied pace* The defense budget 
for the fiscal year 1 9 3 9* announced during the first week in
August, was increased £1,115,169 over the previous year* Of
_ _ 67this increase £o87*715 was given to the Army* Minister of
^Sfilner, Policies in the Far East, p. 91*
^Belshaw, New Zealand, p* 308*
64Fraser was assuming office in place of Savage who 
was quite ill at the time•
^Milner, Policies in the Far East, p. 91*
The Evening Post (Wellington), July 26, 1939* P * 10*
^Ifoid*, August 2, 1939* P* 7*
18
Defense Jones reported that the Territorials, although only 
partially trained, were adequate to defend New Zealand, and
68the Air Force had enough bombers to stop any Japanese fleet*
During the last days of August, however, the threat 
of the ’’yellow peril” was all but forgotten* The Evening 
Post (Wellington) relegated the war in China to several small 
columns on the back pages to make room for the details of the 
German Invasion of Poland* The deterioration of relations 
between Germany and Great Britain caused New Zealand to com­
pletely realign herself with British foreign and defense 
policy* To show the mother country that the Dominion stood 
by her side, Fraser announced that messages had been sent as­
suring Great Britain that she had the full support of New
69Zealand— whatever the outcome* That same day, September 2, 
Fraser proclaimed a state of emergency and Defense Minister 
Jones mobilized the small standing Army*
At nine-thirty P* M*, September 3* 1939* only a few
70hours after Britain, New Zealand also declared war*
^Ibid*, August 20, 1939* P« 10.
69 GGNZ to SSDA (information concerning the initials 
appears in the Appendix) in New Zealand* War History Branch* 
Department of Internal Affairs, Documents Relating to New 
Zealand* s Participation in the Second WorlcTwar ( 3 vols* ? 
Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Af­
fairs, 1939-63)* Document 3* September 2, 1939* I* 2. Here­
after cited as Documents* Also see The Evening Post (Welling­
ton), September 2, 1939* P* 10*
70GGNZ to SSDA, and SSDA to GGNZ, Documents 9, 10, and 
11, September 4, 1939* in Documents, 1 , 6-8 * New Zealand did 
not take the official step to declare war but asked Great
19
Within four day® the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
telegraphed the Governor-General of Hew Zealand outlining
Britain's needs* New Zealand was to send one of her light
cruisers to Britain immediately! the other was to stay and
71prevent attacks from armed raiders* Great Britain also
wanted specialists of all kinds to enlist in the British
Army, and, if possible, a contingent of the Hew Zealand Army
to serve in France* The Secretary made it clear that the
possibility of sending part of the Army would be based on
72New Zealand's estimate of Japanese neutrality* In a reply
dated September 13, 1939# New Zealand stated that she would
try to meet all previous requests of the mother country*
She would, further, take the matter of sending troops under
consideration and would be guided by the advice of the United 
7 3Kingdom*
Thus, after completely realigning herself with Britain, 
it was only a matter of time before troops would be sent* On 
November 7, 1939# after talks with the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff and the War Office Staff in London, it was 
decided that the situation in Japan was stable enough to send
Britain to Inform Germany that Hew Zealand was also at war* 
Also see The Evening Post (Wellington), September 4, 1939#
P* 11 •
71SSDA to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom 
(Wellington), Document 24, September 8 , 1940, in Documents,
I. 17.
72Ibid.. pp. 18-19.
SGNZ to SSDA, Document 25, September 13, 1939> in
Documents, I, 21-22*
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the first echelon of slightly over 6 *000 troops— the core
74of New Zealand1 a trained array*
74' Fraser (London) to the Prime Minister of Mew Zealand* 
Document 46* November 11* 1939• in Documents, Z, 36* Britain 
asked for a full division but Mew Zealand did not have this 
large a force of men in combat readiness* The Dominion prom­
ised to send men in three installments or echelons of 
approximately 7 *0 0 0 men per unit*
CHAPTER II
WAR EFFORTS AND ATTITUDES
Preparation for the forthcoming Centennial Exhibition 
occupied the minds of many New Zealanders in the closing 
months of 1939* The decision to send troops overseas had 
been made, but since the war was 1 2 ,0 0 0 miles away, there 
seemed to be little need for concern about war strategy or 
defense problems** The Government, while not encouraging 
this complaisant attitude, contented itself to appealing to 
the people to make greater economic sacrifices and begged 
the young men of the country to volunteer for the service*
The first months of the new year saw little change in 
this attitude* The Government continually reassured the 
country that there would never be conscription of men for 
the armed forces because, in Prime Minister Savage's words,
"• * * to compell men by law to defend their country is, in
effect, to deny the existence of one of their strongest and
2noblest instincts*" With this as a guiding policy, daily 
appeals for volunteers were made* New Zealand men must fight
*The Evening Post (Wellington) in November and Decem­
ber, 1939, reported little news of the war and even less on 
New Zealand defenses and the training of men for the first 
echelon*
2Ibid.. January 29, 19^0, p. 6 .
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to protect Britain* for if the mother country fell and could
3
not buy exports, New Zealand, also, would fall* Recruit­
ment seemed to go quite well* By the time the first echelon
4arrived in the Middle Bast in February, the second was in 
the process of training and Minister of Defense Jones had
long since begun another campaign for men to join the third
5echelon* By sending the best of her young men overseas 
and increasing production, especially of food products, New 
Zealand felt that she was doing her share to combat Nazi 
aggression* This attitude -lasted until the German blitz­
krieg erupted.
Germany invaded the Lowland Countries and Norway 
during April and May, 1940, and by June 1, the British 
Expeditionary Force was being evacuated from the European 
continent* Struggling France, invaded by Italy, soon fell•  ^
Within a few short months German troops were looking across 
the English channel at unprepared, frightened Britain*
The fall of France and the threat of a United Kingdom 
Invasion led to repercussions in the Pacific* Commonwealth
^Ibid*, January 4, 1940, p* 8 *
4General officer commanding New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force to Minister of Defense, Document 71, February 19, 1940, 
in Documents, I, 59*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), January 11, 1940, p* 7*
^New Zealand dutifully declared war on Italy at 10:30 
A* M., June 10, 1940, to correspond exactly with the British 
declaration* GGNZ to SSDA, Document 16, June 10, 1940, in 
Documents, I, 11-12*
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defenses in this area were shattered because Britain needed
every available man and scrap of equipment to protect her
shores* Japan, aware of this glorious opportunity to expand,
laid plans to strike against the powers that had stifled her 
7dreams*
'The formerly inexcitable attitude of Mew Zealanders 
toward the war was shaken to the very foundations by these
events* In a telegram, dated June 14, the new Prime Minister,
SPeter Fraser, was informed that, due to the fall of France,
Great Britain could not adequately defend her Dominions from
q
Japan and therefore must rely on America for help* The
next day the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, sent
another unreassuring telegram outlining the dilemma Britain 
10faced* Finally realising that this war was not a duplicate 
of the Great War, Mew Zealand began remodeling her defenses* 
One of the earliest measures for defense was the pas­
sage of the Emergency Regulations Amendment Act* The original 
bill, passed on September 13, 1939* gave the Government power
7Oliver A* Gillespie, The Pacific (Wellington: War
History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952), p* 9*
8Prime Minister Savage died on March 27, 1940* Peter 
Fraser was then asked to form a government* See The Evening 
Post (Wellington), March 27* 1940, p* 10*
9This was a note for the Prime Minister, not published, 
reviewing the European situation* Documents, III, 206n»
^Winston S* Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II: 
Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co*, 1949)*
pp. 194-196• Hereafter cited as Churchill, Their Finest Hour*
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to control price% prevent profiteering and provide for public 
11safety* An additional amendment, copied after a similar
British act, was now passed giving the Government power to
take any steps necessary for the successful prosecution of 
12the war* The Government did not have to consult Parliament
on each step taken, but merely had to table in the House of
13Representatives the regulations it had made* The full ex­
tent of these emergency regulations was voiced by Fraser 
when he stated, Hth@ only right and decent thing to say is 
that all the resources of the country, every man and woman 
and every coin of money and every ounce of property must be
placed at . . . /the Government•«7 disposal for . . . do-
14fense*H People generally approved of this tremendous
advance in power, but an editorial in The Evening Post
(Wellington) voiced concern that such tremendous authority be
placed in the hands of only one political party* A national
government, as Britain had, would be more representative of
15all the people*
The Evening Post (Wellington), September 4, 1939•
p. 1 1 .
■^2New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVXI (1940),
96* Also see The Evening P o s t (Wellington), June 14, 1940,
p * 8 «
*^HNew Zealand,*1 The Round Table, July, 1940, pp* 943-
944. ---------------
14James Thorn, Peter Frasers New Zealand*s War Time 
Prime Minister (Londons Odhams Press Ltd* , 1952), p. 179* 
Hereafter cited as Thorn, Peter Fraser♦
15The Evening Post (Wellington), June 19, 1940, p* 6 .
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The Labour Party, aware of these and similar senti­
ment s , had been endeavoring to reach an agreement with the 
National Party for such a government# A Council ot Defense 
had been formed in 1937* but offers to seat opposition mem­
bers were immediately rejected since it was only one branch
16of the Government# The National Party was noisily de­
manding a voice in determining the direction of the entire 
country# They continually reminded the Labour Party that 
the war effort lacked direction; besides, with one party in
17power not all people had a voice in determining a direction#
To remove this criticism of the Government, Fraser
proposed a War Council of fifteen members representing in-
18 19dustry, labor, commerce, and both major political parties# 9
The Council's duties would be:
to determine the steps to be taken in all matters of 
defence, all matters connected with the giving of 
military assistance to Great Britain and her Allies, 
afl4 all matters connected with production of goggs, 
and the rendering of services for war purposes#
The opposition, again flatly refusing the offer, stated that
such an organization was cumbersome and would lead to
16J. M# S. Ross, Royal New Zealand Air Force 
(Wellington: War History Branch, Department ofInternal Af­
fairs, 1955)* p# 44# Hereafter cited as Ross, Air Force#
*^Wood, Political and External Affairs, pp# 131-132.
18Proposed membership was six members from the Execu­
tive Council, three opposition members, two men from primary 
industry, one farm union representative, two labor repre­
sentatives, one secondary industry representative, and one 
member from the Returned Soldiers League# See New Zealand, 
Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940), 171*
1 9Ibld., p. 168 20Ibid., p. 2 8 7.
2 6
21confusion, Fraser, however, on June l8 t formally announced 
the organization of a War Council without opposition mem-
2 O
hers hut made it known that members of the National Party
23were welcome anytime they wanted to join*
Further efforts to quiet political unrest was a pro­
posed War Cabinet of five members—-three Labour and two 
National— to act in cooperation with the War Council* The 
duties of this Cabinet would be "* • • to consider and 
determine all matters relating to the Second New Zealand
Expeditionary Force, His Majesty's Naval and Air Force and
24home defence*" Adam W* Hamilton, Leader of the Opposition, 
again refusing to join, stated that since the proposed
cabinet did not deal with production, finance, or man power,
25it had limited use* Sharp debate followed this refusal
which lasted for several weeks* Finally on July 16, Fraser
announced that an agreement had been reached whereby two
26opposition members would join the War Cabinet* Under the
agreement, production for war, war finance requirements, and
any other matter concerning the war were placed on the agenda
27for the Cabinet's consideration* New Zealand now had a
21Ibid., p. 168.
22The Evening Post (Wellington), June 18, 19^0, p • 9*
23Ibid.. p. 8 .
24New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVXI (19^0),
168.
25Ibid.. pp. 168-169. Ibid.. p. 512.
27Ibid.
27
Parliament, general Cabinet, a War Cabinet and a War Council
o fi
to conduct the operations of the country.
The first problem on the agenda of the newly-formed
29War Council was that of conscription* The Labour Govern­
ment, as well as the general public, had been opposed to any 
form of conscription during the first year of the war* The 
fall of Prance, however, changed the attitudes of most people
from complaisancy to favoring a full preparation of New
30Zealand for a greater war effort* First indications that a
conscription law might be introduced came on Hay 26, when
Prime Minister Fraser hinted that the people might have to
place themselves and their money in the service of the Govern- 
31ment* This hint did not come as a surprise to the people*
Several members of the Labour Party had been advocating con-
32scriptlon and businessmen*a associations demanded that the
33Government Institute some sort of policy* ^
28One author contends that most of the war effort prob­
lems were handled in the War Cabinet without party interest 
or publicity interfering with the decisions* See Wood, 
Political and External Affairs, p* 171.
Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
212-213.
^°Baker, The New Zealand People at War. pp* 81 and 449.
^Thorn, Peter Fraser* pp* 177-178* Fraser had led 
militant protests against conscription in World War 1, and 
had been arrested and Jailed for his subversive activities*
For his World War I activities see Ibid*, pp* 36-47*
32Chief among the Labour Party advocates for conscrip­
tion was Edward L* Cullen from the Hawke * s Bay area* See New 
Zealand, Parliamentary Debates* CCLVII (1940), 2 6 5•
•^ The Evening Post (Wellington), May 22, 1940, p* 11*
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On June 19* Fraser stated that the War Council, rather
than Parliament f would decide on the matter of compulsory
military service* He argued that the Council was composed
of men with the experience to handle this question— one that
34was much too detailed for Parliament* The War Council *
with unusual efficiency, passed a series of recommendations
on June 22* These weres
1* All males nineteen to forty-six must register*
2* Selection for service be restricted to single men*
3* Territorials be brought up to war establishment and 
the standards be the same as the 2nd New Zealand 
Expeditionary force*
4* Voluntary enlistment, with the exception of the Air 
Force* cease July 22*
5* Only men twenty-one to forty-one should be taken for 
overseas service; this included men serving in the 
Territorials*
From these recommendations a conscription procedure 
was organized and administered by the National Service De­
partment* Hen were conscripted from the General Reserve of 
all males over age sixteen* Those eligible for service were 
divided into three divisions* The first being single men
eighteen to forty-five; the second being married men eighteen
36to forty-five; and the third— all other men* The men, 
after an examination, would be divided into four medical 
classes* Class 1 was fit for overseas service; Class XI was 
fit for service only in New Zealand; Class III was fit for
^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940), 
212-213.
^The Evening Post (Wellington), June 22, 1940, p. 12* 
^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
251.

30
would be garrisoned by men too young for the Expeditionary
Force, returned soldiers too old to go overseas, by men
without any previous military service, or those unlit lor
4 3the Expeditionary Force*
Mounted troops as a delense lorce were also being 
considered by the Government* In a speech in the House ol 
Representatives, C« A* Wilkinson, member ol Parliament, 
charged that the Government had turned down the services ol 
lourteen or lilteen hundred horsemen* He remarked that Hew 
Zealand, with its extensive coastline, was not in a position 
to turn down the services ol anyone* Mounted troops, ac­
cording to Wilkinson, would be most helplul because ol their
4 4
mobility and their ability to live oil the land* Alter a 
series ol debates about the elliciency ol such troops and 
their ability to light a modern war, it was publicly an­
nounced that nine mounted units would be lormed lor New
45Zealand delense*
Even with the rapid build-up, the armed lorces were 
still inadequate* This lact was made undeniably clear by 
Frank Langstone, Minister ol External Allalrs, in a speech 
belore the House ol Representatives* He stated that 21,000 
men were already serving with the Expeditionary Force and
4 3Ibid., June 10, 19^0, p. 11.
4 4New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
352-353-
^^The Evening Post (Wellington), July 16, 1940,
p. 1 0 .
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more would be needed* Many of these men were taken from 
Territorial ranks and could not be replaced until after the 
entire Expeditionary Force had been trained* Thus It would 
be at least two or three months before any type of force
46could be trained adequately for the defense of New Zealand*
The anxiety and nakedness New Zealand felt after the
fall of France was Increased by the deterioration of Japanese**
British relations* On June 26, Britain Informed the Dominion
that Japan was about to ask the United Kingdom to close the
Burma Road* Because the United States was eminently involved
In supplying China, Britain first asked the Americans what
47help they would offer in this crisis* The British felt
there were two answers to the problem* One was to close the
Road for three months to any large freight volume like that
which had passed over the road the past year; the second was
to negotiate a general settlement in China* Xf the British
Government was to take any stand against Japan, they would
hope that the United States would Join in trying to negotiate
a general settlement and also transport a part of their
48Pacific fleet to Singapore as a show of unified force* the
46New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CChVII (1940),
250-251.
^SSDA to GGNZ, Document 1, June 26, 1940, in Docu­
ments. XIX, 1-4.
48Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols*; 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948 ), I, 897 and 900* 
Hereafter cited as Hull, Memoirs* Also see SSDA to GGNZ, 
Document 2, July 2, 1940, in Documents, XXX, 5*
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American Government replied that sending a force to Singapore
would leave the Atlantic uncomfortably open. They added that
strong economic pressure was already being applied on Japan;
besides, the United States did not believe in giving con-
49cessions to a country at the expense of a third power.
Such a rebuff of hopeful joint action between the United
States and Britain left the latter very little choice. Oh
July 11, after consulting her Dominions, Britain announced
that the Burma Hoad would be closed for the three months
50during the rainy season.
New Zealand did not like any thought of making con­
cessions to Japan. While talks between the United States 
and Britain were in progress, the Dominion informed the 
mother country that she fully agreed with the decision to 
get a clear-cut definition of policy from the Americans, but 
she felt that Britain should show a measure of confidence in
her relations with Japan— rather than conciliation and weak* 
51ness. On receiving word that the Burma Road was closed, 
the New Zealand Government voiced apprehension over the pos­
sibility of alienating the United States and bluntly added 
. . we neither understand nor sympathize with the policy
49Hull, Memoira. I, 897-898.
SSDA to GGNZ, Document 5, July 11, 1940, in Docu- 
ments, III, 10-11. The Burma Road was closed from July 17 
to October 17*
^*Tbid., Document 3» July 3* 1940, pp. 8-9#
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that has been adopted vis-a-vis Japan* • • • To soften
these remarks the Government added that they did not mean
to add to the difficulties of the United Kingdom ”. • . whose
decision on this difficult matter we have accepted in the
53past and will no doubt accept in the future*”"
To New Zealanders the Far Eastern situation looked 
very grave, so bleak, in fact, that when the Government re­
ceived notice that troop carriers were on their way to pick
54up the third echelon, it was apprehensive about releasing
them* This decision proved difficult* If the third echelon
was sent, the country would be entirely denuded of a fully-
trained army* A long coastline and many harbors made the
country particularly vulnerable to attack, and with untrained
men and few arms she would be easy prey* On the other hand,
it was felt that, since the war was not in the Far East, the
Dominion would stand or fall according to decisions being
55made in battles at the main theaters of the war. After 
long deliberation, it was decided that the troops must be 
sent to supplement the first echelon in Egypt so the New
56Zealanders could form a fighting force in the Middle East.
52GGNZ to SSDA, Document 8, July 30, 1940, Ibid., 15*
53Ibid.
5^SSDA to GGNZ, Document 223, July 30, 1940, Ibid*,
I, 169*
33GGNZ to SSDA, Document 224, August 3t 1940, Ibid., 
171-173*
^Ibid. The second echelon had been, despite the 
protests of the New Zealand Government, diverted to England
34
Troops that were to act as reinforcements would be held 
back, however, and dispatched to the Fiji Islands to organ­
ize a front line defense there.57
The telegram Informing Britain of the decision to 
send the third echelon had Just been sent when the Prime 
Minister received a message stating that the British Com­
bined Chiefs of Staff were preparing a report of the Pacific 
situation. Churchill, In the telegram, announced that If 
Japan declared war on the British Empire* an early attempt 
to Invade Australia or New Zealand was considered unlikely* 
Xt was believed that Japan was either too occupied in China 
or would seek out the rich prizes offered by the Netherlands 
East Indies* Furthermore, if Japan did move in the direc­
tion of the South Pacific Dominions, the long lines of com- 
sunication would make Invasion extremely hazardous* 7 If 
the Pacific Dominions were threatened, Churchill added, all
to help repel the expected invasion* They arrived June 21, 
and were not expected to join their twin in the Middle East 
for some time* It was hoped that the third echelon would 
increase the size of the Middle East force enough to make 
it an efficient fighting unit* For more information on the 
second echelon see GGNZ to SSDA, Document 129, May 2, 1940, 
Ibid*. 98.
*^GGNZ to SSDA, Document 224, August 3* 1940, Ibid*, 
171*173. The troops held back numbered 3*050* This meant 
287 officers, 53 nurses and 5,791 other ranks departed for 
the Middle East*
58^ SSDA to the High Commissioner for the United King­
dom (Wellington), Document 2, August 11, 1940, Ibid*, III, 
17.
59Ibid.. p. 18
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available British ships would move from the Mediterranean to
the Far East* He went on to outline the state of British
defenses in an effort to show Hew Zealand that the United
60Kingdom was continually growing stronger*
The next day* the New Zealand Government received the
report entitled "Appreciation by the United Kingdom Chiefs
61of Staff on the Situation in the Far East, August, 19^0*,f 
The first part of the report stated that Japanese advances 
in Southern China and Hainan, the situation in Indo-China, 
the development of communications and air bases in Thailand, 
and new long-range aircraft increased the threat to Malaya, 
which the arrival of a fleet could only partially protect.
The fall of France, the threat to Britain, and combating 
both the German and the Italian Navy made it almost impossible
62for the British to even send a fleet to the Far East*
The report next dealt with possible invasion points*
It was estimated that Japan might attack British possessions 
with Malaya and Singapore as her first target* Under this 
assumption, New Zealand and Australia would be threatened, 
but not until Japan had consolidated her gains both in China 
and Malaya* "The Rising Sun" might also decide to penetrate 
Indo-China and Thailand in a move west, or might attack the
6°Ibid.
SSDA to the High Commissioner for the United King­
dom (Wellington), Appendix XV, August 12, 19^0, Ibid*, 5^0- 
552.
Ibid.. p. 5%0.
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Butch last Indies* Another possible invasion point was the 
Philippines, but this was considered unlikely since Japan 
would not want to incur the wrath of the United States.63
To carry out an attack on any of these probable tar­
gets, it was estimated Japan had ten battleships, three to 
seven aircraft carriers, with the necessary number of des­
troyers and cruisers, six to ten divisions of men available,
64213 carrier-borne planes, and 432 land-based aircraft*
To combat such a force, Britain had in the Far East a small, 
inadequate fleet, eighty-eight first-line aircraft, and a 
handful of men*^
If Japan should strike at Malaya— and at this time it 
seemed obvious that they would do so— the British would need 
the help of the Dutch* With the combined forces of the more
modern Netherlands Pacific air and sea forces, a stronger
67defense of the Far East could be made* The cooperation of 
the Dutch was not a certain fact, however, nor were the 
British sure they would help if the Netherlands' Indies were 
attacked* Throughout the report it was stated in emphatic
63Ibid.. pp. 5^3-545. Ibid.. p. 543.
65 «Ibid*, p* 552* Britain had one o-inch cruiser, one
6-inch cruiser, six armed merchant ships, five old destroyers,
and a number of smaller vessels*
Ibid*, pp* 550-551. Of the eighty-eight aircraft,
about half were obsolete* There were nine British batt&lions
stationed in Malaya*
Ibid.. pp. 550 and 553- The Dutch had 144 first- 
line aircraft, two cruisers, seven destroyers and sixteen 
submarines at their disposal*
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terms that any cooperation with the Netherlands was only an 
68assumption*
This rather bleak outlook of Far Eastern defenses was
soon followed by an announcement that Japan had signed a
pact with Germany and Italy* The tripartite agreement
was aimed at the United States but an ominous threat to the
British Empire could not be mistaken* Telegrams, sent daily
to New Zealand, Informed her of the situation and stated
that if the United States went to war with Japan, the United
70Kingdom might follow. The Government replied that, if
the United States found themselves at war as a result of
concerted action with the British Commonwealth over Issues
in the Far East, the Commonwealth should most certainly join
71America in declaring war*
Xt now appeared to the New Zealand Government that 
any month might mean invasion with few trained men to stop 
the invader* Efforts to increase home defenses received
Ibid., pp. 548-551.
GoF* C* Jones, Japan*s New Order in East Asia. 1937- 
k5 (London and others: Oxford University Press, 1954), p*
199• Hereafter cited as Jones, Japan*s New Order* The Pact 
was signed September 27, 19^0* See also SSDA to GGNZ, 
Document 17, October 3, X9%0, in Documents, XXX, 28-29•
^°SSDA to the High Commissioner for the United King­
dom (Wellington), Documents 19 and 20, October 8, 19^0, in 
Documents, XXX, 31.
^GGNZ to SSDA, Document 21, October 9* 19^0, Xbid*,
31.
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renewed vigor* It was announced that changes would he made 
so that the Territorials could be mobilized more rapidly*
This group of men was to be expanded as rapidly as facilities 
could be arranged to train them; 40,OOO to 50,000 men, in­
cluding reinforcements for the Expeditionary Force, was the
72training goal for the near future* Minister of National
Service, Robert Seraple, also announced that a Home Guard,
composed of men not eligible for Territorial or overseas
7 3service, would be created and taught the basics of combat
as well as the geography of their own country* As these men
progressed in training, their duties would be beach patrols,
guarding vital points, making maps of areas not outlined by
the regular Army, and, if invasion did come, would oppose
enemy landings in isolated areas until mobile Army units ar- 
7 4rived. The Home Guard would be equipped with weapons not 
used by the Army* The acute shortage of equipment meant
that all men would not have rifles, but it was hoped that by
75the end of the year this problem would be alleviated*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), October 7% 1940, p* 8*
7 3Ibid*, October 3, 1940, p* 13* The Home Guard was 
modeled after a like organization in Britain* New Zealand 
already had a Military Reserve which received some training, 
but this new organization largely overshadowed it* It was 
conceivable, however, for a man to belong to both— -as did 
many returned soldiers* This confusion was not ended until 
February, 1942, when the National Military Reserve was in­
corporated into the Home Guard* See The Evening Post 
(Wellington), February 4, 1942, p* 6*
^^Tbid., December 3* 1940, p* 5*
75Ib±d
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In addition to the increase in the Army* The Emer­
gency Precautions Scheme (EPS) and the Women's War Service
Auxiliary (WWSA) were also organized* The EPS, though not
76an entirely new organization, was expanded to receive all 
people who could not join the armed forces* The organiza­
tion's duties were taking care of the wounded, fighting fires, 
transportation, sanitation, and other civil defense duties*
The WWSA would do much the same thing only in a more limited 
77sense *
Concentration on building mine sweepers was the goal
of the Hew Zealand Wavy* A German raider had mined several
approaches to Auckland Harbor in June, and at this time,
there were only four over-aged fishing trawlers used as 
79sweepers* ' The Government, therefore, embarked on an ex­
tensive program that ultimately resulted in adequate mine
Sosweeper protection*
^ N e w  Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
99 —lOO• Organized ujider the Defense Act of 1909 v the EPS 
was under civilian control until an invasion would automat­
ically place it under Army command* See also Nash, A 
Working Democracy, p* 88* Nash states that the EPS was or­
ganized in 1931*
^ Ne w  Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940), 
100* See also The EveningPost(Wellington), October 3,
1940, p* 13.
^Waters, The Navy, pp* 119-120, also 170* Two hun­
dred twenty-eight moored contact mines were laid*
79Ibid., p. 193*
AnIbid*, p* 176. Between October, 1940, and the end 
of the war, New Zealand built thirteen sweepers at a cost 
of E7 8 0 ,0 0 0.
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The German raider in Hew Zealand waters also made
Siapparent the need for long-range aircraft• Early in the 
war the Dominion had asked Britain for eighteen modern air­
craft if the situation with Japan became worse; in Hay the
United Kingdom agreed that eighteen aircraft would be re­
ft o
leased from her orders in the United States* These planes 
apparently did not come * for on November 2d* Prime Minister 
Fraser informed Britain that a German raider had attacked 
another New Zealand ship* Only two planes could travel the 
distance to defend her and these, occupied elsewhere, were 
eight hours late in arriving* Even if the planes arrived in 
time, Fraser stated, they had no effective weapons to des­
troy the attacker* He pleaded with the British Government 
to send aircraft of any type to remedy this helpless situa-
Q o Ail
tion* After receiving a refusal, Fraser sent another 
telegram reminding Churchill that New Zealand had voluntarily 
released bomber orders at the start of the war to help in 
the defense of the mother c o u n t r y * N e w  Zealand, conveyed
8lRoss, Air Force, p* 69* New Zealand apparently did 
not have any aircraft with a range of over four hundred miles*
®2Ibid., pp* 68-69* Britain had promised fifty 
modern training craft, but due to the shortage in airplanes, 
they did not arrive*
3GGNZ to SSDA, D o c u m e n t  1 8 9 , November 2 8 , 1940, in 
Documents, XXX, 213*
84SSDA to GGNZ, Document 190, December 2, 1940, Ibid*,
214*
**5GGNZ to SSDA, Document 191* December 4, 1940, Ibid, 
New Zealand had thirty Wellington bombers on order but can­
celed the order so Britain could have them*
4l
the Prime Minister, would not be in such a helpless position
if the bombers had come* A half dozen planes were all that
the Dominion would want-— enough to frighten off raiders*
These planes would even be available for the defense of 
86Singapore* In a reply outlining the glowing exploits of 
the Mew Zealand Expeditionary Force, Churchill told Fraser 
that bombers could not be taken away from the defense of
Q*y
England* The small Dominion had no where else to turn for
aircraft* True, she had an agreement with the United States 
88to buy craft, but Britain received priority* Mew Zealand 
would have to suffer*
Without planes the defense of the Fiji Islands, 1,000 
miles away, seemed an Unsurmountable task* It was decided, 
however, that these islands should be fortified as the first 
line of defense for New Zealand* Over 2,000 reinforcements
86Xbid.. p. 2X5.
SSDA to GGNZ, Document 192, December 14, 1940, 
Ibid., p. 216.
88U. S*, Statutes at Large, LIV, Part 2, 2263-2277. 
Mutual agreement signed at Wellington January 30, and Febru­
ary 2 8 , 1940, for the importation of civil aircraft into New 
Zealand* This was only the first attempt to secure better 
relations with the United States* In July, at the height of 
the crisis, Fraser asked the British Government to relay a 
message asking the American Government if they would be in­
terested in exchanging diplomats* Due to other pressing 
matters and the coolness of Britain toward this idea, it was 
five months before the American Government was informed of 
the message* Again there was a delay, but finally, on Janu­
ary 23, 1941, the Wellington Government announced that a New 
Zealand representative would be sent to America* On Febru­
ary 14, 1941, Walter Nash, chosen for the post, presented 
his credentials to Roosevelt* For details see Vasserman, 
f,The United States and New Zealand,” pp. 267-272*
Ao
were sent, but even when joined with the native troops,
the force seemed pitifully small* Planes had been sent in
August, but they were merely four in number and then, were
90only trainers. Other defense equipment was in short sup­
ply, so short, in fact, that three old guns were salvaged
from a Public Works storehouse and parts were confiscated
91from a museum to make them work*
Government appeals for the people to join in the
defense of the country were met by an indifferent attitude*
There were few men who volunteered for the Home Guard; the
other organizations had even more trouble obtaining recruits*
Plans were formulated to dig trenches and shelters around
Wellington, but no one would volunteer to help.^ People
viewed the defense measures as a chance for men to play
94soldiers and treated the organizations as such* The atti­
tude of the people in the closing months of 1940 was not 
entirely their fault* Replacements for the Expeditionary 
Force were balloted in December and would be sent away to
89Minister of Defense to General Bernard Freyberg, 
Commander, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, Document 38, 
October 12, 1940, in Documents, II, 29*
90Ross, Air Force * pp. 70-72*
91Gille»pie, The Pacific, p. 23.
92The Evening Post (Wellington), December 7, 1940, p.
12 *
^^Ibid., December 6, 1940, p. 6*
^Ibid*, November 11, 1940, p. 6*
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95fight a distant war. Fraser’s Christmas message spoke of
96peace and victory* The Minister of National Service,
Sample, stated that 200,000 men would be in the Home Guard 
» 97by early 1941• This would surely be enough men to defend
a small country. The Evening Post (Wellington) related the
glowing exploits of the British Royal Air Force in the bat*
tie for Britain, but said little of Japanese movements in
the Pacific* Yet the signs were ominous*
Britain was in a very tenuous position* She could
neither strongly oppose Japan diplomatically, nor could she
adequately help the Pacific Commonwealth should they be
attacked* Japan was forced to move south in search of
98materials to sustain her war economy* New Zealand had 
few trained men and, even more critical, few if any modern 
weapons* On December 29, 1940, Roosevelt announced plans
^ Ib i d ., October 17* 1940, p* 4*
96Thorn, Peter Fraser, p. 184*
07The Evening Post (Wellington), December 21, 1940,
p* 10*
98Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States 
Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. Ill, The Rising Sun 
in the Pacific» 1931«^April«-»i<9¥2 (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1948), p. 60. Hereafter cited as Morison, The 
Rising Sun. The United States had cut Japanese supplies tre­
mendously by enforcing several embargoes. On June 5, 1940, 
strategic minerals, chemicals, as well as aircraft engines, 
parts and other air equipment were stopped. Aviation fuel, 
lubricants, and certain classes of iron and steel materials 
were halted on July 26. A complete embargo of all steel 
was enforced September 30, 1940.
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99for a lend-lease program to the Allies. ' Fraser, expressing
his Joy, exclaimed "never in history . • . /has7 there been
a pronouncement by a nation not actually engaged in warfare
100so sweeping, effective and helpful." The Prime Minister
undoubtedly felt that this new American program would relieve 
the critical weapon shortage* Any effective lend~lease help, 
however, was almost beyond sight while the clouds of a Far 
Eastern war were moving dangerously close to New Zealand*
^Thorn, Peter Fraser. p. 185*
CHAPTER III
JAPAN MOVES SOOTH
Events early in the new year, 1941, persuaded Japan
to expand her area of conquest* The United States embargo
of* goods stifled the economy of the "Rising Sun," attempting
to force her to submit to the will of the western power* To
break this strangle hold, Japan turned hungrily toward her
1
rich, weak southwestern neighbors* With the help of Germany 
she forced French Indo-China into agreements which eventu­
ally gave her the needed military bases for the conquest of
2the mineral rich Netherlands East Indies*
New Zealanders, informed, but only mildly concerned
about previous Japanese movements, now received daily wara-
ings of the grave threat to their security* In a speech on
February 14, 1941, Prime Minister Fraser warned that the tide
4of war was nearing New Zealand * s shores and, although he 
did not specifically mention Japan, his strong implication
^Hull, Memoirs. II, 9 8 3.
2Jones, Japan* s New Order, pp* 235*238*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), February 11, 1941, 
p* 7j February 14, p * 6 5  February 25* p* 7\ February 2 7 * p*
8 *
4Ibid.. February 14, 1941, p. 8.
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left no doubt In the minds of his countrymen* That same 
day an editorial in The Evening Post {Wellington) warned 
of the menace of Japan* Xt urged the New Zealand people to 
become united and dedicate themselves entirely to the war 
effort
Despite the na3?ve outlook of the people and strong
6opposition of some members of Parliament, the Labour Govern­
ment continued to step up defense preparations— ‘turning first 
to the Army* The standing Army was increased by keeping all 
men who had just finished their basic training on active
duty rather than allowing them to return home and train only 
7
on weekends* Greater expansion was guaranteed by relaxing
regulations for age and physical fitness* All single men
ages eighteen to forty-five were required to enroll for the 
8service* Future Territorials would be drawn from these, 
and instead of taking only those men in the best physical 
condition, men who had previously been rejected for overseas 
service because of minor disabilities were now ordered to
M M M M *  * P  *  ^  *
£New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLXX (1941),
196* T* F* Doyle, member of the Legislative Council, stated 
that Japan did not have the ability to expand the war be­
cause of food, industrial and manpower shortages*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), March 3? 1941, p. 8 . 
Previously, men returned home after training and waited for 
orders to be called back into the service as they were needed*
Q
Ibid* * March 23 * 1941, p* 10* Exceptions to this 
were Maoris, aliens and conscientious objectors*
9join one of the civil defense branches* It was decided
that married men ages eighteen to forty-five should register
for the service in May and would form a second division of
10the General Reserve* As Japanese intentions became
clearer in May, the Government decided that eighteen-year-
olds would be called up to serve with the Territorials or
11the Home Guard* Married men without children, though now
enrolled, would not be conscripted until the end of the year* 
The Home Guard was also in the process of being re­
organized* Because of the diversity of age between the men
in the organization, training geared to the ages of the men
13was instituted* The Government was also formulating plans
to have all personnel in the Guard drafted, as were the men
14in the regular Array* The biggest problem concerning the
9
Ibid* * p* 11* Grades of men taken were 1, la and 2, 
out of a possible five grades*
10Ibid*, p • 10* All single men formed the first di­
vision of the General Reserve* Men with three children were 
at this time exempted from the service*
11Ibid*, May 22, 1941, p* 11* As soon as men reached 
the age of nineteen they were usually sent overseas*
^ I b i d *, June 15• 1941, p • 8 * Instead of placing men 
with three or more children on the deferred list, men were 
now graded according to the number of children they had* 
Conceivably then, no physically fit man was exempt from the 
service*
1 3Ibid.. March 2 6 , 1941, p. 7.
14Ibid*, May 1, 1941, p* 11* The Home Guard was a 
volunteer organization except for men who were unfit for the 
overseas force and the Territorials* These men were ordered 
to join the Guard* Most of the members, however, were 
veterans of World War X and older men*
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Home Guard was not enticing the men to join, but acquiring 
enough weapons to arm them.15 A member of Parliament
branded them a "broomstick force*H He stated that although
the enrollment figure had reached 100,000, only older men
attended the evening and veekead drills because younger men
had grown weary of the game of* marching when there were few
rifles and no other means of defending themselves if the
l8enemy did come* To alleviate this problem, Fraser, as
early as February, appealed to the people owning British
17*303 rifles to give them to the Army* The Government, due
to the poor response, later ordered all people owning such
l8rifles to give them to the Army at once* Even with these
conscripted weapons, the Home Guard was still poorly armed*
The Emergency Precautions Scheme was next to come
tinder the scrutiny of the Government* This organization was
expanded to include an Emergency Fire Service* Men, unfit
for military service, were asked to volunteer and train to
19help the regular fire department in all emergencies*
15Ibid.. April 21, 1941, p. 9. The Home Guard was, 
at this time, estimated at 98,500*
16New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLIX (1941), 
2 9 5-2 9 6• Sir Aplrana Ngata, Member of Parliament, was speak­
ing* He was not exaggerating* In one detachment of eighty 
troops there were only seven rifles* See The Evening Post 
(Wellington), April 1, 1941, p* 10*
* T^fao Evening Post (Wellington), February 20, 1941,
p* 11.
1 A
Ibid.. May 3, 1941, p. 8.
19lbid.. April 4, 1941, p. 5-
k9
Lighting restrictions were other measures taken to
protect the people and the country* Xn February, Fraser
announced that New Zealand, modeling themselves after Great
Britain, would install air raid sirens, and restrictions on
20house and automobile lights would soon be forthcoming*
Mild lighting restrictions were soon announced and were
gradually increased until coastal cities had a bare minimum
21of lighting at night* Shaded head lights were mandatory
for all automobiles and even harsher vehicle lighting re-
22strictions were enforced in coastal cities*
The international situation created maximum efforts 
in war manufacture* British war material supply to New 
Zealand was severely limited, forcing New Zealand to launch 
several new enterprises in an effort to better equip her 
Army* Tanks were her first concern* To remedy an almost 
complete lack of this war machine, caterpillar tractors 
were armoured and machine guns mounted on them* This make­
shift tank was quite crude and clumsy because of its heavy 
weight and slow speed, but this handicap was counteracted by
20Ibid*, February 21, 19^1, p* 8.
21Ibid*, May 21, 19^1, p* 10* There were few street 
lights and all shop windows had to be shaded and could use 
a maximum of one sixty-watt bulb* Porch lights on resident 
houses were not allowed.
*"2Ibid*, June 10, 19^1, p. 10; June 28, 19^1, p*
10*
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providing huge transport trucks to carry them rapidly to
23any part of the country.
Mobility lor protection of New Zealand4s long coast* 
line was Increased by the manufacture of carriages lor both 
light and heavy guns. Hie heavy gun carriages, made Irom 
truck parts and mounted on truck tires, were capable ol 
moving thirty-live miles per hour on roads and twelve miles
g Ll
per hour overland. Machine gun carriers, known as Bren
Carriers, were tracked vehicles manulactured Irom British
25Imported parts.
Some munitions lor the armed lorces were also made 
In New Zealand, Concentrated ellorts were made to manufac­
ture small arms ammunition, but the grenade was the Dominion*s
26most important war product. Many factors, however, ham­
pered this phase ol defense, making It Impossible lor New 
Zealand to reach high productive levels. Raw materials, 
machine tools, and technical ability were either non-existent 
or were in such limited supply that output was always quite 
small.27
2^Ibid., March 31, 1941, p. 8. The tank weighed 
twenty-five tons and moved at a top speed of six miles per 
hour. The New Zealand Army seldom had enough vehicles, so 
whenever carriers of any kind were needed they were usually 
impressed from the people. See Ibid., March 10, 1941, P* 9 
or July 1$, 1941, p ♦ 8.
2^Ibid., April 4, 1941, p. 8. These were made for 
6 0-pounders or 6-inch howitzers.
2^Ibid., February 4, 1941, p. 5«
26lbid. 27Ibid., March 4, 1941, p. 8
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By mid-year, defenses Had been greatly strengthened 
In comparison to the past year* When her defenses were com­
pared with the sophisticated weapons of the major warring
28powers, however, the small Dominion was almost naked* Her
Air Force was small and consisted almost entirely of obsolete 
29
planes; 7 the Navy was composed largely of small craft, and
the 145,000 man home defense force was only partially trained
30and meagerly equipped* Acutely aware of her defenseless 
position if Japan became an enemy, New Zealand refused to 
become Just another small island in British and American 
Pacific war strategical plans* She demanded a voice and par­
ticipated in many of the conferences that dealt with the 
Aslan problem*
New Zealand, in January and February, sent represen­
tatives to Washington to participate in what was later known 
as the ABC-1 Staff Agreements* The conference was primarily 
concerned with the war in Europe, but some resolutions con­
cerning the Far East were discussed* It was agreed that the 
United States would increase its fleet in the Atlantic to
2^Gillespi©, The Pacific* p* 4* In June, 1941, 
coastal defenses consisted of two 6-inch and two 4-inch guns*
2^Ho s8| Air Force * p* 77•
^The Evening Post (Wellington), Hay 23, 1941, p. 8* 
Territorial strength at this time was 45,000* With one hun­
dred thousand Home Guardsmen, this would appear to be an 
adequate force* The Territorials, however, were continually 
drained to go overseas, and even they, due to a lack of 
weapons, were usually only partially trained*
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allow the British to move a part of their fleet to Singapore*
In addition, the American Pacific fleet would extend its
patrols further south to protect British Islands in the
31South Pacific* Too small to have a commanding voice in 
these proceedings, New Zealand agreed with the resolutions 
but added that she hoped • • every possible step would be
tahen to expedite the arrival of the main fleet at
32Singapore » • *M
Singapore, the hub of British Far Eastern defenses,
33was the scene of another conference in April* Proposals
were exchanged on the deployment of combined naval forces
in the Indian and Pacific Oceans* Discussions also centered
on Luzon in the Northern Philippines and other probable
bases of attach against Japan* It was suggested that if
Luzon fell the United States fleet would withdraw to
Singapore; however, no political commitments to this effect 
34were reached* For the Americans this conference was a 
great disappointment because the countries involved, namely 
New Zealand, Australia and the Netherlands Indies, were pri­
marily concerned with local waters, whereas the United States
31Herbert Feis, The Hoad to Pearl Harbor t The Coming
of the War between the United States and Japan (Princetons
Princeton University Press, 1946), pp* I6 9-1SB. Hereafter 
cited as Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor♦
^2Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Docu­
ment 24, May 21, 1941, in Documents, III, 34.
^Gillespie, The Pacific» p. 14.
34Ibid
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wanted a broad strategical plan for the whole area.^
Though little was accomplished, problems and proposals con­
cerning the ever-increasing Japanese menace were aired*
These conferences were indicative of Japanese pres­
sures being exerted* The German Invasion of Russia on 
June 22 forced Japan to make a decision* She must either 
support Germany by also invading Russia, or move south* On
July 2, chief Japanese military and civil figures came to-
36gether and plans were officially made to move south*
French Xndo-China was singled out as the first goal and was
to be occupied as soon as possible* On July 14, Japan pre-
37sented her demands to the Vichy Government. ' After several
days of impatient waiting the French Government was told
that unless an answer to the Japanese ultimatum was received
immediately, Japanese troops would invade the entire country*
On July 24, the French yielded! the same day 40,000 Japanese
38troops moved into southern Xndo-China*
The American and British governments were completely 
aware of what was occurring because the Japanese code had
^Horison, The Rising Sun, pp* 54-55* For more de­
tail of the conference see Maurice Matloff and Edwin M* Snell, 
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942« in 
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR XI (Washington: Office of
Chief of Military History, Department of Army, 1953)* pp• 
6 5-6 7 * Hereafter cited as Matloff and Snell, Strategic Plan- 
ni»iig #
36Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor * p* 215*
261*
38
37Ibid* Also see Jones, Japan1a New Order, pp. 260-
Jones, Japan1s New Order, p* 2 6 2*
54
39 4o 41been broken. On July 5, and again on July 151 Fraser
was Informed of Japanese probable Intentions* When the oc­
cupation of Xndo-China did occur, voluminous correspondence 
passed between Britain and her Dominions on possible ways to 
retaliate for such seemingly open aggression*
The British Government offered two retaliatory 
measures to be decided upon In conjunction with her Dominions* 
The first resolution called for restrictions on Japanese
shipping facilities In Malaya; the other contemplated denounc-
l±2Ing the long-standing commercial treaty* The New Zealand
Government replied that they agreed with the proposal to
abrogate the treaty and would do so as soon as word was re-
4 3
celved that the mother country gave her consent* The small 
Dominion, however, would have preferred a somewhat stronger 
stand* She suggested a Joint declaration be made by the 
Netherlands East Indies, Britain, the United States, and the 
Pacific Dominions stating any future move south, affecting
39Xbld.. p. 263.
4nSSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu­
ment 2 5 , July 5♦ 19^1, In Documents, III, 35* Prime Minister
Fraser was In London at this time*
4iSSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu­
ment 2 8 , July 15» 19^1» Ibid*, p* 3 8*
4oSSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu­
ment 26, July 9« 19^13 Ibid*, p* 3 6* The commercial treaty
was signed In 1 9 1 1*
4 3
Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Docu­
ment 29, July 16, 19^11 Ibid*, p. 39*
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the security of* the above countries, might be regarded as
an attack upon ail* If* the United States would not Join,
New Zealand Celt that such a proposal should be made anyway,
thus making it clear to Japan the exact position of the
44
other countries* The joint declaration was not forth­
coming, but the Commercial Agreement was abrogated July 25 
in Britain and July 27 in New Zealand.45
The United States decided that, as a retaliatory 
measure, Japanese assets would be frozen* Britain immedi­
ately contemplated doing the same and Informed the Dominions
47
of her intentions* ' The New Zealand Government replied
that while they were aware of the tense situation which
greater economic sanctions might cause, it was felt that
close cooperation with the United States was necessary in
48every endeavor to deter Japan* After further consideration,
4 9Britain, New Zealand, and the Dutch also froze Japanese assets*
44Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Docu­
ment 31, July 16, 1941, Ibid., p. 40.
45SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu­
ment 41, July 25, 1941, Ibid*, p. 50* Acting Prime Minister
to SSDA, Document 43, July 27, 1941, Ibid*, p* 50*
^^Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, p* 65*
47SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu­
ment 35, July 22, 1941, in Documents, III, 44*
43Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to Rt• Hon* P. 
Fraser (London), Document 37, July 24, 1941, Ibid*, p* 47*
^Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, p* 65* Also 
see The Evening Post (Wellington), July 2&, 1941, pp. 8 and 
9*
56
The new economic restrictions seriously affected the
Japanese economy* By a single blow, three-quarters of her
foreign trade was severed* Reserves of oil, essential in
fighting a war, were estimated to last between eighteen
50months and two years* Japan had two alternatives. She 
must either slowly withdraw her forces from China and ac­
cept defeat or take what she needed* She chose force*
Britain had Just made the decision to impose economic
restrictions when word was received that Japan intended to
51occupy Thailand* Prime Minister Churchill immediately 
informed the Dominions that the British Ambassador in 
Washington was instructed to ask the United States Government 
to Join in a communique with the British Commonwealth warning 
Japan that grave consequences would occur if the ’’Rising Sun” 
took such action* American concurrence to such a proposal, 
Churchill added, might be difficult to get* ^ 2 The Mew
Zealand Government, preferring a wait-and-see policy with
5 3Japan before deciding upon a course of action, replied
^°J• R* M* Butler, Grand Strategy. Vol* III, pt• 2 , 
Junea 1941— August ^ 1942 in History of the Second World War« 
United Kingdom Military Series, edited by J. R* M. Butler 
(London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1964), 246-247* Also
see Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p* 252.
51SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu­
ment 44, August 1, 1941, in Documents, III, 51*
52SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu­
ment 45, August 1, 1941, Ibid*, p « 52 and 52n*
53Ac ting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime 
Minister of Australia, Document 48, August 14, 1941, Ibid*, 
p. 57* This telegram was repeated to the Secretary of State
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that 1 • • * it would seem unwise to take such action unless 
and until there is available a force sufficiently strong 
enough to ensure successful resistence to Japan in the area
54threatened.M Britain still wanted to send a warning to 
Japan, but the reluctance of the United States and an im* 
provement in the situation seemed to make it unnecessary.55 
She was, however, prepared to give Thailand as much assist*
56ance as the European and Far Eastern situation would allow.
New Zealand, until the attack on Pearl Harbor, was
daily informed by Britain of the negotiations and increasing
tension between the United States and Japan. Continually
strong in her attitude toward Japan, the small Dominion
found the final Japanese proposal to the United States com*
57pletely unacceptable. Knowing that this strong stand was
for Dominion Affairs and the Prime Ministers of Canada and 
South Africa.
54Ibid., p. 5 6 .
55SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu­
ment 54, September 2, 1941, Ibid., pp. 61*62.
56SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 
64, November 17* 1941, Ibid., p. 70.
Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 70, 
November 24, 1941, Ibid., p. 7 6 . Japan's final proposal to 
the United States stated that Japan would withdraw from Indo* 
China when peace was restored with China or when peace in 
the Pacific was arranged. The United States would unfreeze 
Japanese assets and also provide a specified quantity of oil 
to Japan. In addition, the United States would refrain from 
prejudicing efforts to restore peace between China and Japan. 
For details see Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 309 or SSDA to 
Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 6 9 , November 23, 1941, 
131 Documents. Ill, 77.
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not backed by any force, New Zealand pleaded with Britain 
for more help and hastened to improve her own meager defenses* 
At the height of the Xndo-China and Thailand crisis, 
Australia and New Zealand asked Britain about the defense of 
Singapore* Both countries felt that Singapore should be re-
50
inforced as soon as the European situation allowed.
Britain, aware that negotiations between the United States 
and Japan were crumbling, informed the Dominions that despite 
the demands of the European war, two new battleships, the HMS 
Prince of Vales and the HMS Repulse would be sent to
M H M M i W M M N M M pN M W  W W N SM N M IIH M M M M M M
CO
Singapore• ' Additional reinforcements came during the criti­
cal month of November* Troops were transported to Malaya,
the Americans sent planes on the new Lend-Lease bill, and the
60British started gathering a Far Eastern fleet*
18^ Prime Minister of Australia to SSDA, Document 47, 
August 11, 1941, in Documents, III, 54-55 and Prime Minister 
of New Zealand to Prime Mini &t er of Australia, Document 48, 
August 14, 1941, Ibid., pp. 55-56*
^^Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to Prime Min­
ister of New Zealand, Document 59* October 31, 1941, Ibid., 
p • 67* There were several reasons for the delay in sending 
ships* One reason was that in August Japan reinforced her 
Manchurian Army* This was interpreted to mean a Northern 
rather than a Southern movement by the Japanese. Another rea­
son was that all available ships were needed to carry supplies 
for a Hew Middle East offensive* See J* M* A* Gwyer, Grand 
Strategy, Vol. Ill, pt• 1, June, 1941— August, 1942, in His­
tory of the Second World War, United Kingdom Series, edited 
by J. R. M. Butler (London: H* M. Stationary Office, 1964),
2 8 0-2 8 1* Hereafter cited as Gwyer, Grand Strategy, June,
194l--August, 1942* The ships arrived in Singapore December 
2, 194i. See Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 6l6-6l9•
^°Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 301* The Far Eastern 
fleet, as proposed in the ABC-1 agreements called for two or 
three aircraft carriers, six battleships and an adequate es­
cort of destroyers and cruisers*
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While patiently waiting for Great Britain to reinforce
Singapore, the New Zealand Government was not idle* General
Sir Guy Williams, British military expert called to New
6lZealand to make recommendations for home defense, reported
that the Home Guard ought to be reorganized, and suggested
62that the organization be closely tied to the Army* On 
August 1, formal announcement of a complete reorganization 
was made* Hen were now compelled to attend all parades and 
were also divided into separate divisions* The first divi­
sion , composed of "prime men," would act as a fighting force;
the second division would be less physically fit and would
6 3act as a reserve* To enhance the training of both the 
Home Guard and the Territorials, Brigadier General Edward 
Puttick, a member of the Expeditionary Force, was recalled
54to New Zealand to assume duties as Chief of General Staff*
The Territorial force also received another reorgani­
zation* With the exception of those conscripted in the past 
few months, this force received three months initial training 
and then only two weeks camp training, plus out-of-camp weekly 
parades, per year* General Williams recommended that all 
troops receive two months, instead of two weeks, annual
6lThe Evening Post (Wellington), June 24, 1941, p* 8 * 
Ibid., July 21, 1941, p. 8 .
Ibid., August 1, 1941, p. 6 .
6 4Ibid., p. 8 .
Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 213.
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66training. To carry out this program, about one-sixth or 
the officers and other ranks were mobilized to provide a 
cadre of specially-trained men to handle the yearly train­
ing of* the Territorials, or the training of* new recruits,
67should mobilization be ordered*
Weapons to supply this reorganized home defense force
were still almost impossible to find. In a telegram to the
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, the Prime Minister
stated that efforts were being made to bring defenses up to
the standards of the Expeditionary Force* Such standards
were hard to reach, however, because fl * • • unlike other
Dominions, New Zealand is unable to manufacture essential
arms for its own use and is therefore entirely dependent on
68overseas sources • • •" Fraser added that they needed 
equipment and asked for weapons of all kinds including rifles, 
bayonets, tanks, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, machine
69guns, and all the ammunition for firing the above weapons*
66Ibid*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), September 19, 1941, 
p. 4* A cadre consisted of about 5*700 Territorials* It is 
interesting to note that in the height of the summer Far 
Eastern crisis, 2 3 *8 2 5 men were drafted for the Expeditionary 
Force and many of these were taken from the ranks of the 
Territorials* See Xbid*, August 5, 1941, p. 8*
68Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 
193* September 4, 1941, in Documents, XXX, 217*
69Ib±d.
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Britain, busily producing these essential items for her own
70needs, could only send a few tanks*
The New Zealand Navy was In a like state o 1 imp rep ar- 
edness. As ol July 30, the fleet consisted ol two 7*000-ton 
cruisers, the HMS Achilles and HMS Leander, one armed merchant 
vessel, one government vessel, nine mine sweepers or auxil­
iary sweepers and a host ol small patrol cralt* Naval per­
sonnel consisted ol 349 officers and 3*®34 ranks, serving at
71home and overseas* General Williams, in a report on 
October 1, did not recommend an increase in this lorce, but 
advised that some of New Zealand’s small harbors be mined
and closed and all approach areas to the main harbors be
72mined* An estimate ol the cost ol such preliminary pre­
cautions was not presented to the Defense Minister until 
November 27, and was not formally adopted until December 
15, 1941. 73
The Air Force, as ol July 30* consisted ol 30,000
74men, though many ol these were connected with the British
^°The Evening Post (Wellington), October 20, 1941,
P* 5*
^ I bi d * i July 30, 1941, p* 9* The Navy had not been 
greatly enlarged since September, 1939* See Waters, The 
Navy, p. 14*
72Waters, The Navy, p. 223-
7 3Ibid*, pp* 224 and 225* The estimated cost was 
El,000,000*
^The Evening lost (Wellington), July 30, 1941, p*
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air arm* Due to the shortage of* equipment, little improve*
75ment had been made since early 1941• New Zealanders now
boasted of an aircraft factory, but this Industry employed
76a mere 225 men and did not make engines or instruments*
These necessary items had to be imported and were almost im­
possible to get*
The Fiji Islands, supposedly New Zealand's first line 
of defense were, as of November, defended by 4,943 men*
Weapons included six 18-pound artillery guns, twelve dilapi-
77dated aircraft, one old ship, and five patrol launches*
When Japan ordered the mobilization of their Southern 
. 78Army on November 6 , “there was not one anti-aircraft gun
in the South West Pacific * * * and the strength of defenses
79would not have deterred the most irresolute enemy*M
75Ross, Air Force, p* 77* During the late months of 
1941, New Zealand did receive some Hudson bombers from 
United Kingdom allocations in the United States* Modern air­
craft , however, was still very scarce in New Zealand*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), August 21, 1941, p *
10 *
^Gillespie, The Pacific, p* 42*
7 Ibid., p. 12. 7 9Ibid., p. 42.
CHAPTER IV
THE THREAT OF INVASION
On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor*
The Government of New Zealand had received warnings of 
Japanese movements the previous day,**- but, as In the United
States, the attack came as a surprise* The Government
2quickly reacted by declaring war on Japan and then turned 
to the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff for estimates of the 
country's defense needs to withstand the probable invasion* 
On December 8, the military generals issued a report 
stating that six months would elapse before an invasion
force would threaten the country, and only then if the
/
United States suffered another major defeat and the 11 for- 
tress" at Singapore fell*
^SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Documents 
90-98, December 7, 1941, in Documents* III, 97-104* New 
Zealand received a detailed account of the proceedings be­
tween Japan and the United States from the last days of 
November until the attack*
2The Evening Post (Wellington), December 9« 1941, 
p* 8* New Zealand declared war on Japan at 11 A* M* , 
December 8, 1941*
3"wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 214* The 
Chiefs also recommended that, if adequate naval protection 
could be found, the reinforcements for the Expeditionary 
Force should be sent* They stated New Zealand need only 
to mobilise the 4,600 fortress troops*
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Within a few days, two hug* new battleships, the HMS
Prince of* Wales and the HMS Repulse, sent by Prime Minister
4Churchill to protect Singapore, had been sunk* This tragedy
prompted Prime Minister Fraser, on December 11, to speak to
the Hew Zealand House or Representatives concerning the
country's position* He declared that the loss of the two
battleships as well as the recent Japanese attacks on Malaya,
Hong Kong, and other United States and United Kingdom pos-
5sessions had placed New Zealand in extreme danger* The 
Prime Minister added that the War Cabinet was closely watch­
ing the situation and said that the necessary steps were 
being taken to defend the country. Fraser revealed that the 
entire Air Force, plus units of the Home Guard and Terri­
torials, had already been called to duty* In addition, entry 
or new recruits into service had been moved up irom January 
to December 15* and all leave had been canceled tor members 
oi the Armed Services— exceptions being made tor those re­
placements destined for immediate service in the Expeditionary 
6Force* In matters or civil derense ot the population, the
ij.
The Evening Post (Wellington), December 11, 1941, p*
9* These two battle ships, arriving at Singapore on Decem­
ber 6 , were supposed to have been accompanied by an aircrart 
carrier, but an unfortunate accident sent the carrier to 
port tor repairs* Without air protection, the Japanese 
quickly sank both ships* For details ot the sinking see 
J* M* A* Gwyer, Grand Strategy. June, 1941— August, 1942, 
pp. 308-310.
^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLXX (1942), 24* 
Ibid.
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Emergency Precautions group had been placed on constant 
alert* To impress upon the people the gravity oF the situa­
tion, Fraser exclaimed, "It is the plain duty of* every man 
and woman to Join up with the appropriate organization and 
to prepare themselves to do their part when the country may
be Fighting For its very existence and when the lives oF
7every man, woman, and child may be in danger• "
The Prime Minister's estimate oF his country's dan*
gerous position was not exaggerated* Preoccupation with the
war in Europe and the diFFiculty oF obtaining material had
leFt the New Zealand defense Force tragically inadequate.
Her Air Force consisted oF thirty-six bombers and twenty-nine
other First-line aircraFt• She had some 251 other craft» but
these were either obsolete or were trainers and could be
8used only in case oF extreme emergency* The Navy had not
9be en measurably expanded since July, 1941* The Army had 
13,250 men in camp (including reinForcements For the 2nd di­
vision and the Fiji Islands), 4,600 Fortress troops, and 
other small training cadres, all exclusive oF the Home Guard*
7Ibid.. p. 25.
8Gillespie, The PaclFic, pp* 43-44. The Air Force con­
tained 10,500 personnel, but 2,512 had been sent to Canada 
to train For action over Europe* A plan called the FAFAI 
Scheme, was also organized, whereby, in emergency, every 
available plane and every available pilot would be employed
as bombers— regardless IF the plane was a Fighter, trainer,
or civilian craft# For details see Ross, Air Force* p* 111*
9See Chapter XXX, p. 61.
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On December 15, 11,000 Territorial recruits entered camp;
by the end of December, 2 8 ,8 5 0 men were in camp, and the
Army was preparing facilities for a total of 39,350 troops
10by January 10* The poorly-trained and meagerly-equipped
Home Guard was issued fifty none-too-new machine guns but
11was not given further training*
The Fiji Islands, New Zealand*s first line of defense
and an important air reinforcing chain for the United States,
was heavily reinforced with all existing anti-aircraft and
Bofor guns, as well as eighteen field guns, two 6 -inch
howitzers and two 6 0-pound field guns* Manpower was also
12increased by over 4,000 men*
Throughout the remainder of December, the Government
continued to place the country on an emergency war footing*
All men between ages twenty-one and fifty-five, with as many
as three dependent children, were asked to enroll in some
13defense organization* People living in cities were ordered
^Gillespie, The Pacific, pp. 43-44. The Territorials, 
numbering 31,000, were not mobilized at this time* See also 
Wood, Political and External Affairs, pp. 212-213*
12Chief of General Staff (Wellington) to General
Freyberg, Document 53* January 2, 1942, in Documents, II, 3 6. 
Prime Minister of New Zealand to Rt • Hon* W ins t on Chur chill 
(Washington), Document 257, Ibid*, III, 294-295* Fraser did 
not tell Churchill that the only four anti-aircraft and the 
only four Bofor guns possessed by New Zealand were sent to 
the Fiji Islands and were taken from coastal emplacements* 
These guns were replaced with dummies until more guns arrived 
from Britain* See Gillespie, The Pacific, p* 46*
*^The Evening Post (Wellington), December 19* 1941,
p* 6*
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3.4to make provision for entire blackouts in home and factory
and, although the cities were not fully darkened, many full
15blackout practices occurred during December* Men were also 
asked to help dig trenches around the cities to act as bomb 
shelters or defense positions but, despite several pleas, 
few people responded*^
The situation for New Zealand looked falsely optimis­
tic by the end of December* American troops and equipment
17were arriving in Australia and, after urgent appeals to 
the United Kingdom and the United States, military supplies 
consisting mainly of small arms and ammunition, but Including 
some big guns, began arriving in New Zealand* The anti­
quated Air Force also received word that it would get planes 
and did, in fact, receive thirty Hudson bombers by the end
19
of December* These events prompted Lieutenant General Sir
Edward Puttick, Commander of the forces in New Zealand, to
announce that things were looking good in the Pacific but, he
20added, "* • • the crisis is not over*"
Ibid. lgIbid.. December 15, 19^1, p. 6.
1g
x Ibid., December 18, 1941, p* 8.
^Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, pp. 8 3 , 8 5 *
On December 12, 1941, a convoy of American troops and planes 
were diverted from Manila to Australia* On December 15, two 
more ships were ordered to load with munitions and planes 
for Australia*
“^ Gillespie, The Pacific, p* 44*
197Hoas, Air Force, p. 77*
2^The Evening Post (Wellington), December 21, 1941, p.
4.
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Indeed, the real crisis had only begun* By the end 
of December the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Issued another 
report— more serious and threatening than the last* The 
revised estimate of probable invasion stated that if the 
American fleet suffered another serious defeat, an attack 
could come within three months* To defend the country at 
least six divisions would be needed, and currently, only 
three divisions had been formed* They recommended that the 
reinforcements scheduled to go to the Middle East in Janu­
ary should remain and that no reinforcements be sent to the 
European theater until December, 19%2*
The Prime Minister immediately cabled General Bernard 
Freyberg, Commander of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force, that the situation with Japan and the possible threat 
to the Fiji Islands necessitated diverting some, or all, 
re infore ement s away from the Near East* Fraser added that 
the Government had no intentions of forgetting New Zealand’s
commitments to that theater, but circumstances in the South
22Pacific made retention of these troops necessary* On 
December 30, the Prime Minister announced that a complete
21
Gordon, New Zealand Becomes sl Pacific Power, p* 175*
22Prime Minister to General Freyberg, Document 52, 
December 26, 19^1, in Documents, II, 3 6* In a reply,
Freyberg revealed thathis command had enough reinforcements 
to last six months or, with luck, until August, 19^2, after 
which he hoped that more men would arrive* See General 
Freyberg to Prime Minister, Document 5^* January 5* 19^2, 
Ibid*, pp. 38-39.
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mobilization of the Territorials and Expeditionary Force
2 3reinforcements would take place January 10*
Several days after Fraser's announcement the United
States informed the New Zealand Government that an attack
on the Fiji Islands could take place at any time* The scale
of attack was estimated to be one division with four air-
24craft carriers as an escort. Since mobilization was only
a few days removed, New Zealand decided to wait. On January
10 the Dominion mobilized:
. . .  twenty-three battalions and eighteen being 
formed, nine mounted rifle regiments, and miscellane­
ous and^ancil 1 ary troops. Medium guns and howitzers 
. . .  /were/ . . .  utilised to cover various anchor­
ages, leaving only one troop of 6 -inch howitzers for 
the field forces. Field artillery . . .  ^/included7 
thirty-six 25-pounders and fifty 18-pounders. The 
total strength . . .  /wajs7  approximately 5 0 ,0 0 0  by 
10 January, rising to 62,000 about one month later, 
and 68*000 ultimately, all exclusive of the Home 
Guard.
On the day of mobilization, New Zealand Chiefs of 
Staff issued yet another report on defense in relation to
2^The Evening Post (Wellington), December 30, 1941,
p . 6.
Gillespie, the Pacific, p. 2 6. This was not an 
idle warning. According to Churchill, Japan planned to 
take the Fiji Islands and other islands to obtain jumping 
off points in invasions of New Zealand, Australia and Hawaii. 
See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol. IV:
The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950),
p. 239* Hereafter cited as Churchill, Hinge of Fate.
2^The Chief of General Staff (Wellington) to General 
Freyberg GOC 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (Egypt), 
Document 194, January 2, 1942, in Documents, III, 217-218.
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the resources of its Far Eastern neighbors* This analysis
stated that Japan needed resources such as rice, tin, rubber,
oil, etc., and these items were not found in New Zealand*
Thus it would neither be necessary to attack New Zealand
nor, in the estimation of the Generals, would the country
be attacked until either Allied naval power was destroyed or
26Allied power to reinforce the Far East failed* In their
opinion, Japan had four possible objectives* The first was
to secure China by cutting off supplies; the second was to
eliminate the Allied naval force by neutralizing Singapore
and Manila; the third was acquiring resources in the South
Sea; and the fourth was keeping the Allies from interrupting
27pursuit of the other three objectives* The last objective 
presented the danger to New Zealand* Japan would, according 
to the Chiefs of Staff, seize strategic islands to secure 
and consolidate her possessions* The Fiji Islands would be 
among those attacked, therefore, New Zealand should do 
everything possible to fortify them* In conclusion, the 
Generals felt that New Zealand and surrounding islands would 
have to fear only small raiding parties until Japan had se-
28cured her gains and could launch a major invasion force*
Although this report was more encouraging than those 
in the past, frenzied preparations for air attack or invasion
28Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ja Pacific Power, p* 148•
27Ibld.. p. 149-
oft
Ibid*• PP* 150-151.
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continued* Authorization was given to local governments
and to the Emergency Precautions Scheme to confiscate
oqbuildings and lands for use as air raid shelters* The
general public was also warned to have buckets of water
ready at all times for fires caused by incendiary bombs.
Due to gaps in the EPS ranks caused by recent ballots for
the service, the organization was made compulsory for all
men between the ages of eighteen and sixty-six who did not
31or could not belong to the Armed Services*
Workers in New Zealand were also required to regis­
ter with the Government* The reasons given for this were 
11 • • • to direct them into work of national importance, to 
stop workers from leaving industries which were regarded as
essential, and to restrict the engagement of labourers into
32industries not regarded as essential•11
Men for the Army continued to be balloted at a rapid
pace throughout January* All eligible single men had been
drafted by late December, 1941, thus forcing the Government,
3 3on January 20, to ballot 27*104 married men between the
34ages of eighteen and forty-five who were without children*
The Evening Post (Wellington), January 6, 1942, p*
8; January 8, 1942, P~* ST
^^Ibid*, January 21, 1942, p. 6*
^^Ibid*, January 22, 1942, p* 8.
32Baker, The New Zealand People at War, p* 97*
^^The Evening Post (Wellington), January 21, 1942, p* 4.
^^Ibid*, January 6, 1942, p. 6. Also see Nash, A 
Working Democracy, p. 115*
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The Home Guard was taken out of civilian control and placed
35under the Army, but was not mobilized.
The Air Force, though suffering from an acute short­
age of planes, was, nevertheless, in a continuous state of
expansion. In addition to several new airfields constructed
before the war, many more were now being planned and
36equipped for operation by large, heavy-duty craft• Radar
stations were also being established in New Zealand, but
37there was much work left to be done in this area*
It had, by this time, become uncomfortably obvious
that battles in this war could be won or lost by air support.
New Zealand, acutely aware of her nakedness in this area,
pleaded with the United Kingdom throughout January and the
first weeks in February for planes. Fighter planes were
critically needed for the protection of any bomber force
38that would strike at an invasion convoy. Short-range in­
terceptor craft were needed to protect Auckland and
39Wellington, New Zealand's two main ports.^ Prime Minister
^Nash, Working Democracy, p. Il6•
Ibid.. pp. 1X4-115.
37Ross, Air Force, p. 115* Lack of fighter planes 
made ground radar unnecessary. Most of what little equip­
ment New Zealand had went into air radar to detect invaders. 
When the Allies came, a different radar network had to be 
installed.
3 8Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 
195* January 30, 19^2, in Documents, III, 218.
39Ibid
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Fraseri in a telegram to Churchill, asked for only two 
squadrons of long-range fighters and two squadrons of inter­
ceptor fighters i the minimum amount needed for the protec-
40tlon of the country* Prime Minister Churchill replied 
that a telegram containing the proposed allocations of
4ldefense equipment was already on its way to Mew Zealand*
Before Churchill*s telegram was received, the outline of
defense equipment allocations arrived* It stated that
thirty-six trainer fighter planes, which had been on order
42since the end of December, might be sent, as well as
4 3eighteen additional fighters* J Fraser immediately reminded 
Churchill that most of these aircraft had been on order for 
some time and, although he was grateful, the planes would
44still not be enough to adequately defend the small Dominion* 
After some delay, Churchill wearily replied that he would 
ask the United States to allocate two squadrons of fighters
40
Ibid* Fraser specifically asked for eighteen 
fighters to act as bomber escorts and twenty-seven fighters 
to act as interception aircraft*
41SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 196, 
February 3, 1942, Ibid*, p* 219* In a telegram not published, 
Britain outlined material, primarily rifles, tank artillery 
and planes she would agree to send New Zealand by March 31, 
1942. See Ibid*, 219n.
42Ibid*, p* 220n* An unpublished telegram, dated 
December 27, 1941 * requested planes for New Zealand defense*
4 3Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 197* 
February 4, 1942, Ibid*, p* 220* New Zealand was quite up­
set over these additional eighteen planes because at the 
same time 124 planes were going to Australia*
44Ibid•, p* 221*
7%
to New Zealand and, if the Americans could not comply, he
would divert two United States squadrons destined for North
45Ireland to New Zealand* The prospect of increased fighter
protection coupled with the arrival of an American squadron
46in the Fiji Islands, made the plane situation, by the mid­
dle of February, look somewhat brighter for the frightened 
little country*
New Zealand9s immediate defense interests were closely 
tied to the broader Allied strategical plans for the prose­
cution of the Pacific war* The Dominion was vitally Interested 
in these plans and meant to have a voice in determining Far 
Eastern war strategy* Within a month after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, a unified command of the countries affected by 
the Pacific war was created* Known as the ABDA Command and 
named after the four principle powers in the area, the Com­
mand encompassed the countries of Australia, the Netherlands 
East Indies, Burma, the Philippines, the South China Sea,
the northeast part of the Indian Ocean, and all British and
47American possessions in this area* Sir Archibald WavalX 
was placed in command of the entire area and had subordinate
^SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 196, 
February 14, 19^2, Ibid*, p* 222* On April 9* New Zealand 
was informed that these squadrons would not come*
46Ross, Air Force, p. 174* An American fighter squad­
ron arrived in the Fiji Islands by the end of January* They 
were followed, a few days later, by several flying fortresses* 
Also see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, p. 171*
47Morison, The Rising Sun, p • 277•
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43officers from each of the countries concerned* New 
Zealand was not to be connected with this area but was to be 
part of another section called Australasia, which encom­
passed American shipping lines to the Pacific and was to be
49protected by the Americans*
Fraser, in a rather bitter telegram to Churchill,
emphatically declared he did not agree with this arrange*
50raent• The ABDA area was much too small, New Zealand was
definitely tied to this area and wanted a full voice in the
51proceedings of the Command* The Prime Minister, referring 
to New Zealand’s isolation caused by the ABDA Command, de­
clared that the country had always abided by past decisions 
made by the British Government because each decision eould 
mean the life of the United Kingdom, but now, with the war 
at New Zealand’s doorstep, it was vitally necessary for the
Dominion to have a part in the decisions made by the higher
50authorities— whether in London or Washington*
Japanese gains in the South Pacific and the incessant 
demands of New Zealand resulted in the organization of a
48SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 
112, December 29, 1941, in Documents* III, 113-114.
Ibid.. p. 114.
50Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 
117, January 17, 1942, Ibid* * p. 124.
51Ibid.. p. 1 2 5 .
52lbid.. p. 1 2 8 .
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53naval command known as Anzac.  ^ This area encompassed part
of Australia« British New Guinea« the Solomons, the Fiji
Islands, and New Zealand with Vic© Admiral H. F. Leary, USN,
54as Commander in Chief*. Soon after the formation of this 
new area was announced, Fraser received another telegram 
stating that plans were being formulated for a council com­
posed of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. This war council would be closely connected 
with the United States and would have a voice in the direc­
tion of the Pacific Var#^ New Zealand replied that the
United States should definitely have a seat on this policy- 
56making body^ and that a council in London with communications
57in Washington would be much too clumsy, therefore, the
^^Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to Prime 
Minister of New Zealand, Document 119* January 14, 1942, 
Ibid., p. 124.
54Morison, The Rising Sun, pp. 277-278.
^^SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 121, 
January 17* 1942, in Documents, III, 133* See also Document 
123* January 19* 1942, Ibid., pp. 134-135* Churchill, Hinge 
of Fate, p. 18.
56Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 124, 
January 20, 1942* in Documents, III, 125*
*57'Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 129, 
January 26, 1942, Ibid., p. 142. The combined British- 
Axnerlcan Chiefs of Staff were located at Washington. Mes­
sages would have to be transmitted between New Zealand, the 
Council in London, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, 
back to the Council and then back to the President of the 
United States for confirmation.
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58organization should probably be in Washington* This
realistic proposal was forwarded through London to Washington
whereupon Roosevelt, agreeing with Churchill, stated that the
59council should be held in London* Such formidable opposi­
tion quieted all dissenting opinion, thus making it possible
6ofor the council to meet February 10* New Zealand received 
her voice in the conduct of the Pacific war but, somewhat 
disgruntled with the situation, continued to fight for the
6l
organization of a Washington war council*
Areas of command for the prosecution of the war had 
no sooner been organized when events forced complete altera­
tion* Xn December the Japanese landed on Malaya and steady
fighting had finally forced the defenders, by February 2,
62to withdraw to Singapore island* By February 12, most of 
the "impregnable fortress" had to be blown up to prevent it
^Ibid., p. 143* Also see The Evening Post (Welling­
ton), January 2 8 , 1942, p* 6 *
59SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 
133* February 2 , 1942, Ibid., pp. 145-146.
^Churchill, Hinge of Fat®, p* 19* Also see Nicholas 
Mansorgh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs; Problems 
of War Time Cooperation and Post War Change, 1939-52 
(London and others: Oxford University Press,1955)7 P* 137*
Hereafter cited as Mansergh, Survey of Commonwe alth Affairs*
6lSee Documents 139 > 141, 143, and 145 In Documents. 
Ill, 1 5 1-1 5 2 , 154, 155, 1 5 6 .
^ 2
The Evening Post (Wellington), February 2, 1942,
p. 5.
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6 3from Calling into Japanese hands•  ^ Four days later
6%Churchill announced that Singapore had fallen. Fraser,
In an announcement th© same day, stated, ,fIt would be Idle
and wrong to pretend that the fall of Singapore has not
brought danger nearer to our shores. But while there Is
ample cause for well-grounded concern, there Is no room for
65foolish or frantic panic*"
The danger to New Zealand was certainly great enough
to cause panic. The FIJI Islands were now the only fortified
islands that lay between New Zealand and the Japanese Navy,
66and they had received possible attach warnings. On
February 17* Fraser cabled Churchill an outline of possible
67Japanese objectives. ' They were: (1) attack Burma, (2)
go through Burma to attack India, (3) attack Australia, and
68(4) attack New Zealand. Xt did not seem plausible that 
Japan would venture an attack on India, but she might try
63m»id.. February 12, 1942, p. 7*
Ibid., February 16, 1942, p. 5« For events of the 
fall of Singapore see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 92-107*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), February 16, 1942,
p. 6.
66Ross, Air Force, pp. 125-126. On February 13, 
Coastwatchers had sighted a task force headed for the Fiji 
Islands. Pilots were briefed for a possible attack, but the 
Japanese apparently turned in another direction since they 
were not seen the next day.
67Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 
199, February 17, 1942, in Documents, III, 223-227*
6ft
Ibid., p. 225*
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to consolidate her gains by driving th© Allies out of the 
69Pacific, * To prevent this from occurring, the Prim® Minis­
ter felt that both Mew Zealand and the Fiji Islands should
70be heavily fortified* Fraser estimated that minimum air 
strength needed to protect his country, besides those planes 
already possessed by Mew Zealand, would be two long-range and 
two short-range fighter squadrons, on© dive bomber squadron,
four troop carrying planes, and two torpedo bomber or
71medium bomber squadrons*' He also recommended that a host
of other equipment be sent, enough to turn the little
72country into a fortress,'
New Zealand Chiefs of Staff, unlike Fraser, found it
Increasingly difficult to give further estimates of an at-
73tack because of so many varying factors• Japanese strength
could only be estimated and the Japanese in turn would have
to evaluate New Zealand strength, its importance as an Allied
base, and the countryfs importance as a possible Japanese
74base in an attack on Australia* Only one factor remained
Ibid. 7°Ibid.. p. 226.
71Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 200, 
February 19, 1942, Ibid*, p* 231*
72Ibid., p. 229n.
7^Chief of General Staff (Wellington) to tbe New
Zealand Liaison Officer (London), Document 203, February 27, 
1942, Ibid*, p. 231* Also see Gordon, New Zealand Becomes 
a Pacific Power, p. 155*
^Document 203, in Documents, III, 231*
do
constant In the estimate or the Generals. If Allied naval 
fleets were to receive a major defeat, Invasion would seem
quite likely and might succeed because of partially*trained
75men and Inferior weapons.
The lack of weapons and the difficulty In procuring
them spurred New Zealand to greater efforts In home defense
preparation* The program of building air raid shelters was 
76accelerated,' plans were made for population dispersal In
77cities In case of attack, emergency medical facilities were 
7 8organized' and, above all, more men were called for the 
79service•
Though the situation looked dark to many New Zealanders,
evidence of promised American and British aid was starting
to appeari A small American naval force, on February 12,
arrived In New Z e a l a n d T h i s  was followed several days
later by a letter from Roosevelt stating that Americans would
8lsoon strongly reinforce both Pacific Dominions. As Fraser 
was reading this heartening note, 19,000 American soldiers
75Ibid.t p. 232.
76The Evening Post (Wellington), February 14, 1942,
p. 8.
^ I b i d ., February 11, 1942, p. 4*
^^Ibid., February 9* 1942, p. 4*
79Ibid., February 6, 1942, p. 6. All young men were 
called regardless of the number of children they had.
finIbid*, February 12, 1942, p. 8.
^^Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, p. 165*
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Ao
were slowly crossing th© Pacific to Australia* *' There 
would, however, be several more dark clouds before relief 
would come*
8 XTh® continued southern progress of the Japanese * 
and particularly the loss of Singapore, destroyed the ABDA 
area* By the end of February It was decided that the or*
ganization* s headquarters be dissolved and command be trans-
84ferred to the Dutch, who were still fighting In some areas.
85The attack on Darwin, Australia, in February and the
86invasion of New Guinea made the threat of Invasion, for
the Pacific Dominions, seem dangerously close* To substitute
for the rather protective shield of the ABDA Command,
Australia, with full agreement from New Zealand, proposed an
extension of the Anzac area to cover both countries and the
87surrounding islands* An Anzac Council In Washington com­
posed of the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and
Ibid.. p. 1 2 9 .
8 3Gillespie, The Pacific, p* 18* By January 23, the 
Japanese occupied Timor, the Celebes and a part of New 
Guinea*
84SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 
148, February 25, 1942, in Documents, III, 157*
85The Evening Post (Wellington), February 20, 1942,
p. 5*
Q£
Ibid., March 9. 19^2, p. 5.
8 7Prime Minister of Australia to SSDA, Document 151, 
March 4, 1942, in Documents, III, 161*
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Australia, with President Roosevelt as Chairman, would direct
the new command.^
This proposal was sent to the United Kingdom and the
United States, but, in the meantime, the Americans had
offered a counter-proposal• This plan stated that the United
Kingdom would protect and control the area west of Singapore,
including the Indian and Mediterranean Oceans; the United
States would assume responsibility for the area east of
Singapore, including Australia and New Zealand. The President
also suggested a Washington Pacific War Council be organized
to deal with defense questions, leaving the London Council
89to cope with the political disputes.
Several weeks after this new proposal was offered,
New Zealand, much to her dismay, learned that under the new 
arrangement she would again be separated from Australia.
The area defended by the United States would be subdivided 
into several commands. The small Dominion would be opera­
tional headquarters for an area covering the South Pacific
90and including all small islands surrounding New Zealand. 
Australia would be operational headquarters for an area 
Including that country and all immediate approaches to it
AA
Ibid., p. 162.
89High Commissioner for New Zealand (London) to the 
Prime Minister, Document 151, March 4, 1942, Ibid., p. l6l.
^°New Zealand Minister (Washington) to the Prime 
Minister, Document 1 6 7 , March 24, 1942, Ibid., p. 186•
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91and would be designated as tbe South-West Pacific* New 
Zealand, definitely opposed to any separation of the two
Dominions and viewing such proposals as ”imprac tic al and
92dangerous,1* could do little to change existing plans* She
therefore, on April 5, gave her reluctant consent to the
93creation of the new Pacific commands* ^
The disheartening news of separation from Australia
was lessened by the creation of a Washington Council*
Meeting on April 1, 19^2, the Council consisted of members
from the United Kingdom, China, Australia, the Netherlands,
9%Canada, New Zealand, and the United States* This was a
major accomplishment for the Pacific Dominions since they 
would now, at least, be informed of decisions being made 
which affected their areas*
The creation of a new South Pacific Command, with New 
Zealand as its base, foretold the help that would soon come* 
Churchill had already asked President Roosevelt to send
^ N e w  Zealand Minister (Washington) to the Prime 
Minister, Document 178, April 3, 19^2, K i d *, p* 199* Also 
see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, pp* 168-169*
^2Prim« Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister 
of Australia, Document 171, March 26, 19^2, in Documents,
III, 190*
^  Prime Minister of New Zealand to the New Zealand 
Minister, Washington, Document 179, April 5, 19^2, Ibid*,
p * 201•
^Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, p* 217n$ Nash, 
A  Working Democracy, p. 123* The Council was not the policy­
making body that New Zealand and Australia had hoped, but 
rather served to keep the Dominions Informed of the events 
and plans for the Pacific War. See Mansergh, Survey of 
Commonwealth Affairs, pp. 138-139*
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95troops to New Zealand and, Roosevelt replied that the
United States would send a division to New Zealand and a
division to Australia* This, added to the two divisions
en route to the Pacific would make a total of 90,000
96American troops in the area* The division that was to
97come to New Zealand would not, however, sail until Hay 15*
American troops, while appreciated, were, to the New
98Zealand point of view, too few and too slow in coming.
Estimates placed Japanese available strength at twenty-nine
divisions, while New Zealand home strength was three divi- 
99sions* The three divisions, coupled with the American 
division, left the defense force two short of the estimated 
six divisions needed to defend the country*’^ * and pitifully 
small in comparison to estimates of Japanese strength*
On March 27, a long-awaited report from the British 
Chiefs of Staff on New Zealand defenses was received* This
^Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 193 • Churchill wanted 
an American division to go as an alternative to New Zealand 
withdrawing her division from the Middle East*
96Ibid.. p. 195-
^SSDA to Prime Minister of Mew Zealand, Document 208, 
March 10, 1942, in Documents, 111, 235*
98Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 210, 
March 15» 1942, Ibid*, p* 243* It appears that New Zealand 
fears might have been Justified* In February and March, 
Japanese submarines launched reconnaissance planes and made 
several flights over the Wellington and Auckland areas, as 
well as the Fiji Islands* See Gillespie, The Pacific, p*
50 or Waters, The Navy, p* 214*
^Document 210, Documents, III, 245*
above p* 68
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101report stated that an attack was highly unlikely but 1f
it did come, the Japanese would have an estimated eleven
102divisions and live aircraft carriers* To combat this
force the Generals suggested th® Allied naval and ground
forces in the area be bolstered and that New Zealand be
supplied with guns for her poorly-armed army, anti-aircraft
103and anti-tank weapons, but most of all—-airplanes*
Almost immediately after the report was received,
the British Air Ministry told the Dominion that no planes
104were available at the present time* This information
was followed the same day by a telegram from Churchill
stating that United States planes could not be diverted from
105Australia for use in New Zealand* He did add, however,
that some craft would be diverted from the Middle East con- 
sigament and would soon arrive in New Zealand*
lOlNew Zealand Liaison Officer (London) to Chief of 
General Staff (Wellington), Document 219« March 27, 1942, in 
Documents, 1X1, 253* The report stated that a Japanese in­
vasion would entail long lines of communication— easily cut* 
If islands surrounding New Zealand could be held an Invasion 
did not seem likely* If these islands were taken. New 
Zealand would be isolated* This would serve Japanese pur­
poses, thus making invasion unnecessary*
102Ibld. 103Ibld., p. 254.
104SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document
221, March 31, 1942, Ibid., pp. 2 5 7-2 5 8.
SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document
222, March 31, 1942, Ibid., p. 259.
106Ibid.
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The frustration felt by the Labour Government must 
have been immense* The small , frightened country, with no 
bargaining power at her disposal, could only wait for 
relief or invasion-— whichever came first* One of the major 
steps taken in preparing for invasion was the further 
broadening of conscription powers* Besides calling up an 
additional 17,500 men for the Territorial fo rc e s ,^  the 
Home Guard was made compulsory for all men not in some
1 aQ
branch of service* The drafting of men and women for in­
dustry was also enlarged to the extent that on March 14, all
men between ages forty-six and fifty and all women twenty and
109twenty-one, were ordered to register for service* It was
estimated that approximately 20,000 men and a slightly
110larger number of girls would register* These people
would be diverted to defense work of some type in order that
111war production would become more efficient*
The Evening Post (Wellington), March 25, 1942, p*
6* Married men between the ages eighteen and forty-six, 
without children, and men eighteen to twenty-eight, with chil­
dren, were conscripted* When these men were trained, mobi­
lized forces would be 155,132, excluding the 100,000 Home 
Guardsmen. See Prime Minister to New Zealand Minister, 
Washington, Document 209, March 13, 1942, in Documents, III, 
241.
, f)A
^  New Zealand, Parilamentary Debates, CCLXX (1942),
*Q^The Evening Post (Wellington), March 14, 1942, p. 8.
110lbid.. March 17, 19^2, p. 65 March 22, 19*12, p. 6 .
111JPbid., March Ik, 1942, p. 8. Sports such as horse
rac ±n« or football were confined to the time of day or week
when it would least affect the work of the people* See Xbid*,
March 13, 1942, p. 6.
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Preparation Cor Allied relief centered around war
defense construction* A Defense Construction Council was
organised to make sure that all defense works received
112building priority* Works receiving the highest priority
were air bases* New Zealand was told that she would have to
prepare bases for 200 heavy bombers and 400 naval aircraft
113which were coming in the near future* Throughout the
early months 1942, despite the lack of heavy machinery,
114New Zealand constructed new bases and enlarged others*
The imminent possibility of an invasion and th© ap­
parent inability of the home forces to cope with it led to 
a political crisis in the middle of March* The Labour 
Government was charged with being too lenient on the people, 
not mobilizing the entire country for war* and not training 
or arming th© troops a d e q u a t e l y M u c h  of the criticism 
centered around the Home Guard* The opposition charged that* 
while large numbers of men were recruited, there was such a 
lack of equipment that the force was of little use* No one, 
according to the opposition, really believed that this force 
would do much more than M * * • take up slack in a moment of
112Ibid., March 12, 1942, p. 8.
^^Prime Minister to New Zealand Minister, Washington, 
Document 209, March 13, 1942, in Documents * XXI, 239*
114Ross, Air Force * p* 112*
115For th© full debate see New Zealand, Parilamentary 
Debates, CCLXI (1942), 88-181.
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11 g
emergency.*' Other areas, such as giving the people too
117much propaganda, allowing the people to work a normal
118 119forty-hour week, and excessive domestic spending were
also criticized by the National Party* There was little
that the Labour Government could do to defend its program
but outline the progress made and give assurances that the
120country could defend itself*
Zt was quite obvious, however, that the country could 
not defend itself* Thus, when the Prime Minister was in­
formed in early April that 6,000 Americans would be dispatched
121to New Zealand in early May, he replied that he welcomed
the decision and was most anxious that everything be done to
122accelerate assistance by the United States. Resources and
manpower stretched almost to the limit, New Zealand anxiously 
awaited the Americans* On May 21, 1942, Vice Admiral Robert L.
Ghormley, first Commander of the South Pacific area, arrived
123in New Zealand* He was soon followed by an advance party
Xl6Ibid., p. 124. XX7Ibid.. pp. 92-93.
X Ibid.. pp. 95-1X2.
XX9Ibid.. pp. 94-95.
120Zbid*, p. 120* No vote of confidence was taken 
since it was, in most respects, a coalition government.
121New Zealand Minister, Washington, to Prime Minister, 
Document 224, April 9, 1942, in Documents * ZZZ, 26l*
122Prime Minister to New Zealand Minister, Washington, 
Document 225, April 11, 1942, Ibid., p. 26l.
123Nash, Jk Working Democracy, p. 117.
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124 Aof 5,000 American soldiers. On June 18 a complete Marine
125division arrived in the Fiji Islands. The long-awaited
American reinforcements had at last arrived.
12^Baker, New Zealand People at War, p. 73#
12^Prim© Minister to New Zealand Minister, Washington, 
Document 226, June 18, 1942, in Documents, 111, 262.
CHAPTER V
REPRIEVE AND REALIGNMENT
The arrival of American troops did much to relax the 
tension in New Zealand, but the possibility of invasion was 
ever present. At times the presence of American troops 
added to New Zealand fears because they seemed oblivious 
to the shortage of arms among the Dominion's defense forces. 
The New Zealand forces and particularly the Air Force had 
never been actually Included in any c o m m a n d T h i s  made it 
extremely hard to get any war material from the United 
States. New Zealand was eligible for iend-lease under terms 
of the Anglo-British agreement and also an additional agree­
ment that had been concluded separately by the New Zealand
2Government and the United States, but requisition for ma-
3terials still had to go through a long chain of command.
When Admiral Ghormley assumed command of the South Pacific
^Ross, Air Force, p. 109*
2u. S., Statutes at Large. LVI, Part 2, 611-6 1 3 .
3
Ross, Air Force, p. 109* To get planes New Zealand 
first had to go to the British Chiefs of Staff who had to 
approve the requisition. Next the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
Washington had to approve it; from there it passed to the 
Munitions Assignment Committee in Washington, who had to ap­
prove all requisitions in the different theaters of war.
Next it passed to the Air Assignment Committee and then back 
to the Munitions Committee for final approval.
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area with headquarters at Auckland, New Zealanders confi­
dently expected to come under American command and receive 
American supplies. At the beginning Ghormley told them 
that he was neither responsible for New Zealand defense nor
was he obligated to find the necessary materials to assure
4adequate self-defense. However, after three months of 
negotiations with the United States, the Dominion's forces 
were finally placed under Ghormley's command.
More difficulties arose when the United States pro­
posed sending additional troops to the Fiji Islands. These 
troops were to be diverted from American units destined for
New Zealand, and would replace Dominion forces on the 
6Islands, while New Zealand had hoped that troops of both 
nations would fight side by side if the FIJI Islands were
7
invaded. It was a disappointment when they were told that 
withdrawal of the Dominion forces best suited the over-all 
Pacific war effort* Th© Americans, however, added that 
perhaps the withdrawn troops could “• • • be made available 
for amphibious training with . . .  /their/ 1st Marine Division
4Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 244.
5Boss, Air Force, p. 127*
6New Zealand Minister, Washington, to Prime Minister 
of New Zealand, Document 281, May 6 , 1942, in Documents, Ill, 
318• There were 10,000 troops in the Fiji Islands. See 
Gillespie, The Pacific, pp. 50-51.
7
Prime Minister of New Zealand to New Zealand Minister, 
Washington, Document 2 8 2, May 7* 1942, in Documents, III,
318.
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8in anticipation of joint offensive action to the North. *'
New Zealand troops were transported home and became the
9nucleus of a new force known as the 3rd Division* This 
new division was about to begin its amphibian assault train­
ing when events changed the course of New Zealand defense* 
The United States naval fleet had already fought one 
major battle with the Japanese in the Pacific* This action
in the Coral Sea, while seemingly a Japanese victory, had
10kept the enemy from reinforcing New Guinea* Anxious to
inflict a final major defeat upon the United States, the
11Japanese pressed for another battle, on their terms* Be­
tween June 4 and June 7, 1942, the Battle of Midway raged
with a loss of four Japanese aircraft carriers and 250 
12planes* This battle changed the course of the war, fori
8New Zealand Minister, Washington, to Prime Minister 
of New Zealand, Document 304, June 24, 1942, Ibid*, p* 331*
^Gillespie, The Pacific, p* 53* The 3rd Division 
was technically born May ll, 1942, and was formally called 
the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific* 
These troops were never trained for amphibious assault but 
became garrison troops*
lOOne American aircraft carrier and two other ships 
were destroyed by the Japanese* For details of the battle 
see Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval 
Operations in World War IX, Vol. XVi Coral Sea, Midway and 
Submarine Actions * May. 1942— August, 1942 (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1950), pp. 33-64* Hereafter cited as 
Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarines*
^Waters, The Navy, p. 2 8 8.
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At one stroke the strategic situation in the Pacific 
had been reversed* Shorn of a major part of her 
hitherto predominant aircraft-carrier strength,
Japan had lost the initiative* The balance of 
naval power in the Pacific was restored and thence­
forth was to swing rapidly and heavily against 
Japan* The threat to Hew Zealand and Australia 
was definitely removed and in a few weeks the Allied. ~ 
forces passed to the offensive in the South Pacific* **
14Fraser, heartened by the bright outlook, soon
cabled General Freyberg for an estimate of reinforcements
needed in the Far East* The Prime Minister informed the
15General that as many as 2,500 men could be sent* ^ Freyberg
reported that 2,500 would hardly cover the losses sustained
in the last three months* He recommended that 4,700 be sent
16as a start in rebuilding the division* On August 29, the
17War Cabinet approved the dispatch of 5*500 men*
Changes were also made in the civil defense struc­
ture* The Emergency Precautions Scheme was completely 
reorganized* Instead of every city and hamlet maintaining 
a completely Independent unit, Hew Zealand was divided into
12The Americans lost one aircraft carrier* For de­
tails of the battle see Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and 
Submarines, pp. 101-140*
13Waters, The Navy, p. 290.
14 .The Evening Post (Wellington), June 8, 1942, p. 5*
15^Army Headquarters, Wellington, to 2nd New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Document 64, August 5*
1942, in Documents, II, 46*
1 AGeneral Freyberg to Chief of General Staff (Welling­
ton), Document 65 * August 8, 1942, Ibid*, p* 48*
17Ibid., p. 48n.
94
districts with each district containing a chapter y and a
it o
Civil. Defense Minister was placed over the entire body. 
Although this change made it more efficient, some people 
saw little use in the entire Scheme, An editorial In The 
Evening Post (Wellington) accused the Government of con­
tinually complaining about manpower, but being unable to 
see that the EPS was one of the reasons for the shortage.
The editorial advocated complete abandonment of the entire 
19organization. The men who had Joined the Fire Protection 
Scheme voiced the same sentiments when they argued that, in
view of the new situation in the Pacific, the body no longer
. 20 served any purpose,
21Manpower shortages and the prospect of a major
22Allied offensive in the Pacific, prompted Fraser, in
10
Hew Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLXIX (1943)•
387.
19The Evening Post (Wellington), August 29, 1942, p* 8,
2^Ibid., August 8, 1942, p, 8,
21Women twenty-two and twenty-three were drafted to 
work in industries because of manpower shortages. See Ibid,, 
August 3* 1942, p, 4, The Army was also scrutinized to make 
it more efficient. Jobs in the service that could be handled 
by women were catalogued and women were placed in these Jobs 
to allow men to serve in a more useful capacity. See Ibid,, 
September 3, 1942, p* 3• Even with the shortage of manpower 
the Government still had to draft men. By October, 1942, 
all men in the thirty-eight to forty-siac age group, regard­
less of the number of children were being called to serve.
See Ibid,, October 13t 1942, p, 4,
22The naval battle of Guadalcanal, fought November 12- 
15» 1942, has been termed by Morison 11, , , decisive not 
only in the struggle for the Island, but in the Pacific war 
at large.” The Japanese failed to reinforce the island. This
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November, 1942, to ask Prime Minister Churchill if* New
2 3Zealand troops could be withdrawn from the Middle Bast*
Fraser declared that New Zealand could not maintain two di­
visions and continue to meet increased Allied war produc­
tion demands at home* Now that the Middle Eastern situation
24looked comparatively safe, and due to the ever present 
Japanese threat, it was '*• * . felt that the place of the 
2nd New Zealand division • • • /waml here in the South
« m h  mm?
25Pacific*f* x New Zealand became even more demanding when it 
was learned that the Australian divisions were being with-
o £l
drawn to fight the Japanese* Churchill, by pleading
shipping difficulties, shipping hazards, and finally stating
that the loss of Australian troops made the New Zealand di-
27vision more important, ' succeeded in persuading the Labour 
Government to keep the Expeditionary Force in the Middle
ultimately led to an American victory* For details see 
Samuel Eliot Morlson, History of United States Naval Opera­
tions in World War IX, Vol. V: The Struggle for Guadalcanal,
August, 1942— February* 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and
Compiu^^
23Prim© Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister of 
United Kingdom, Document 176, November 19* 1942, in Documents,
II, 142-144.
24Ibid*, p* 142* The victory at Alamein and Allied 
landing® in French North Africa made the Middle East situa­
tion look quite stable*
Z5Xb±d.. p. 144.
26 See Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 249*
2^Prime Minister of United Kingdom to Prime Minister 
of New Zealand, Document 179* December 2, 1942, in Documents, 
II, 147.
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Bast* Australia disturbed with the decision, declared 
" • • • the struggle in New Guinea • • . Important im-
OQ
plications on the security of New Zealand* 11 7 Australian 
troops were lighting there and according to the sister 
Dominion, so should New Zealand forces.
The decision to maintain the 2nd Division in the 
Middle East meant that other measures would have to be taken 
to alleviate the shortages of workers* The Government re­
solved that a cut could be made in the home defense system*
Therefore, in December, 1942, Home Guard training was reduced
30from twenty-four to eight hours per month• ^ Further reduc-
31tions were ordered in February, 1943* and on June 26, it
was announced that the Horae Guard would train twenty-four
32hours per year* Most of the Territorial force were taken
3 3off mobilization standing and placed on reserve• By the
end of June, 1943* the entire defense force was a mere 
3420,000 men. The Emergency Precautions Scheme was further 
20Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister of 
United Kingdom, Document 101, December 4, 1942, Ibid*, p*
149.
29Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister of 
New Zealand, Document 107, December 14, 1942, Ibid*, pp* 
153*154.
^QThe Evening Post (Wellington), December 8 , 1942, p.
8 *
~^ Ibid* * February 6 , 1943, P • 4.
32Ibid., June 2 6 , 1943. P* 6 .
3 3Xbid.
"^Gillespie, The Pacific, p. 109*
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35 36reduced to small mobile units; bomb shelter construction
37and blackouts were stopped.
Still plagued with manpower problems and now forced 
by political pressure to discontinue one of the divisions , ^  
Fraser asked Churchill if he and Roosevelt could send a 
joint telegram conveying to Parliament the need for the 2nd
Division in the European war. This Churchill, in conjunc-
39tlon with Roosevelt, eloquently did.  ^ Swayed by the same
worn-out arguments from the mother country, Parliament gave
its consent to retention of the division in the European 
4otheater. This meant the end of a Pacific division.
The final decision concerning the 2nd Division was
accompanied by a furlough scheme whereby many veteran service-
41men would be returned home for three months. Troops were 
needed to replace those on leave, so men from the now defunct 
3rd Division, trained for jungle warfare, were sent to the
•^ The Evening Post (Wellington), February 27» 1943,
p. 4.
•^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLXIX (1943),
387-388.
37Xbid.. p. 387.
Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister of
United Kingdom, Document 222, April 29, 1943, in Documents,
II. 189.
^Prime Minister of United Kingdom to Prime Minister 
of New Zealand, Document 237, April 21, 1943, Ibid., p. 210.
40Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister of 
United Kingdom, Document 239, May 17, 1943, Ibid., p. 211.
^Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 260.
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42European theater* At the end of* the three months the fur­
loughed men were to go back, but after working and enjoying
43a peaceful life, they refused* The Government could do
nothing, for:
In the face of an angry public and demonstrations 
among the men themselves it proved impossible either 
to force the men to join the ships or to punish them 
for their refusal to do so* The impressive array of 
emergency powers at the disposal of the government 
were proved to count for nothing when confronted with 
determined opinion and action* By the end of 1943, 
the episode showed the war was over as far as the 
average citizen*s immediate awareness was concerned*
^2Ibid* See also William Hosking Oliver, The Story 
of New Zealand (London: Faber and Faber, 19^0), p. 2 6 6 •
^Oliver, The Story of New Zealand, p* 206#
44Ibid*
CONCLUSION
New Zealand, traditionally the most loyal and depen* 
dent of the British Commonwealth countries, sought to 
maintain this distinction throughout the critical years of 
the war* This time-honored policy of looking at the world 
through British eyes led to confusion in conducting the war 
and in matters of defense* Some Labour politicians seemed 
to talk of independence in policy-making, but still talked 
of allegiance to Britain in almost the same breath, while 
other officials, especially military leaders, were willing 
to assess the situation and plan to meet the danger* Gen­
erally the latter were overshadowed by British opinion and 
were often criticized for not following the experienced 
judgment of greater powers* Leaders of the Labour Party, 
anxious to have their policies implemented with as little 
opposition as possible, often used British policies and 
recommendations as the final justifying argument*
It seems clear that New Zealand relied too heavily 
on collective security in planning for the defense of the 
nation* The sending of all of her elite troops to England 
and the Middle East during the first year of the war can be 
justified, but, as the Japanese threat became increasingly
obvious, the continuation of this policy with only a poorly-
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trained force of Territorials and Home Guardsmen— men unfit 
for overseas service— to man home defenses, is difficult to 
understand* Total reliance on Britain and a concentrated 
effort to please the mother country would seem the only 
plausible answer* Singapore was the key to New Zealand de­
fense* New Zealanders were led to believe that the island 
fortress was impregnable and, thus, were convinced that the 
Japanese would be stopped* As long as Singapore was there 
and the British promised a fleet to protect the South Pacific, 
the Dominion felt reasonably safe* In order to send such a 
fleet, however, Britain must also be secure at home; so time 
and again, the statement "If Britain fell the Dominion would 
be helpless*1 is used to justify Mew Zealand's sending more 
men and materials to the European theater* Even during the 
crucial months just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when 
a few people were beginning to he skeptical about such a 
defense posture, the soothing words of Churchill, plus the 
glowing reports of the exploits of the New Zealand Expedition­
ary Force, which appeared regularly in New Zealand newspapers, 
served to satisfy the bulk of New Zealanders*
The brief periods of independent action and the several 
blunt statements made by the Labour Government concerning 
British foreign policy during the war can be attributed 
largely to frustration* Britain failed to supply many of the 
weapons promised, and seemed unable or unwilling to realize 
the Dominion's precarious position* New Zealand, increasingly
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aware of the fact that she must search elsewhere for help, 
attempted to establish stronger relations with the United 
States, but was hampered by the jealousy of the mother country* 
Desperate for assistance and anxious to play a larger role 
in planning the strategy of the Pacific war, the Dominion 
boldly formed and exerted her own opinion on certain strate­
gical issues* Bernard Gordon, in his book New Zealand 
Becomes ex Pacific Power, maintains that, because of this de­
fiant action, New Zealand emerges from the war as a new 
power in the Pacific with a definite national foreign policy* 
This is somewhat hard to justify* New Zealand, by allowing 
her troops to remain in the European theater Instead of with­
drawing them to fight the Japanese, revealed that she was 
content to oppose only in words— not in action— and thus lost 
the chance of measurably gaining political power in Pacific 
relations immediately after the war* Foundations for build­
ing an Independent foreign policy, laid before the war, most 
assuredly were made firmer as a result of the conflict, but 
it is highly questionable to assume that New Zealand had 
cast off her title of "the most loyal of the Dominions*”
One must conclude that New Zealand's position in the 
conflict is somewhat unique— a South Pacific country sending 
her elite troops to fight an enemy more than 12,000 miles 
away, while Japan, the obvious foe, appears about to invade 
the homeland* New Zealand should have demanded and with­
drawn her forces from Europe to protect herself and to help
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her Pacific Allies defeat the Japanese* Despite the many 
explanations given for not doing so, the primary reason was 
that New Zealand still looked at the world with British 
eyes and still sought the praise of the mother country*
The lesson in geography, almost disastrously taught by the 
Japanese, seemed to make few immediate impressions on the 
century-old traditions of New Zealanders*
APPENDIX
SECRETARIES OF STATE AMD GOVKRHORS GEHERAIi
1955— 1943*
The initials SSDA represent Secretary of State for 
Dominion Affairs* The Secretaries of State during the war 
were:
January 28, 1939— September 3* 1939— Viscount Caldecote 
(then Sir Thomas Inship)
September 3, 1939— May 12, 1940— Anthony Eden
May 12, 1940— -October 3, 1940— Viscount Caldecote
October 3, 1940— February 19* 1942— Viscount Cranbrone
February 19, 194-2— September 28, 194-3— Clement At lee
September 28, 194-3— August 3* 194-3— Viscount Cranbrone
August 3, 1945— October 7, 194-7— Viscount Addison
The initials GGHZ represent Governor General of Hew
Zealand* The Governors General were:
1935-1941— Viscount Galway (died March 27, 194-3)
1941-1946— Marshall of the Air Force, Sir Cyril Hawaii
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